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 PRODUCTS LIABILITY, CORPORATE
 STRUCTURE, AND BANKRUPTCY:
 TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND THE
 REMOTE RISK RELATIONSHIP
 ALAN SCHWARTZ*
 THIS paper addresses the interaction of three seemingly unrelated legal
 issues. Each is important in its own right; their interaction poses a prob-
 lem of overwhelming magnitude for our legal system. The three issues
 are: (1) In products liability law, should firms be made to bear risks that
 are difficult to foresee? If no one knew that widgets cause scrofula, but
 they do, should widget manufacturers be liable to scrofula victims? (2) In
 corporate law, to what extent should limited liability isolate firm owners
 from products liability victims? Can company X create a subsidiary to
 produce dangerous products and escape liability for the resultant injuries?
 (3) In bankruptcy law, at least since 1979, can persons exposed to danger-
 ous substances assert claims in the manufacturer's bankruptcy if their
 injuries had not materialized by then? If Smith purchases a drug made by
 company X in 1980, company X files a bankruptcy petition in 1981, and
 the drug sometimes causes injury to users years after ingestion, may a so
 far healthy Smith assert a claim in X's bankruptcy?'
 * Maurice Jones, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center;
 Professor of Law and Social Science, California Institute of Technology. This paper was
 improved by helpful comments made at a U.S.C. Law Center Faculty Workshop, a seminar
 concerning toxic risks held at the California Institute of Technology, a law and economics
 workshop at the University of Chicago, and a faculty workshop at the Boston University
 Law School. The paper also benefited substantially from conversations with Kim Border
 and Jennifer Reinganum and from comments on earlier drafts by Robert Bone, Jules Cole-
 man, Richard Craswell, Thomas Jackson, Will Jones, Stephen Morse, George Priest, Mar-
 garet Jane Radin, Roberta Romano, Steven Shavell, Gary Schwartz, Robert E. Scott,
 Matthew Spitzer, and James Strnad.
 ' The issue is new because under the old Bankruptcy Act one could not be a tort creditor
 until one had been injured. The definition of a provable claim has been expanded sufficiently
 [Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XIV (December 1985)]
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 These three issues recently have attracted attention because of their
 close linkage to "toxic risks." Toxic risks have four salient characteris-
 tics: (i) The substances that create them are neither defectively made nor
 designed, but cause harm because of their chemical nature: they cannot
 do good without also doing bad. (ii) The harms often materialize years or
 decades after persons are initially exposed. (iii) The existence and extent
 of the harms are difficult to predict; some substances turn out to be toxic
 while others do not. (iv) The harms measured in dollars can be large in
 relation to the value of the firms that sell toxic substances, because many
 people are vulnerable to them.2
 The three legal issues are related to each other in the toxic risk context
 because of an obvious but overlooked fact: risks that are fully anticipated
 or minor seldom cause concern to firms or to the law. Toxic risks are hard
 to anticipate and often major. For example, the Johns-Manville company
 now faces tort claims that exceed its value as a firm. It has sought the
 protection of bankruptcy and has considered transferring its asbestos-
 related activities to a newly created subsidiary.3 These drastic responses
 seem poor substitutes for full insurance. Johns-Manville's current plight
 may have resulted from its failure to foresee the full extent of the harm
 that asbestos could cause. The asbestos cases thus raise troublesome
 bankruptcy and corporate law problems because of products liability
 law's prior resolution; the courts, that is, seemingly have imposed an un-
 anticipated liability on the asbestos firms.
 If the firms should have anticipated the asbestos risk, then the problems
 are the necessary price of encouraging firms to discover harms and of
 compensating victims for firm misbehavior. But suppose that private
 firms would not normally discover the full extent of these risks. Is it
 possible for courts to identify with acceptable precision those risks that
 firms should not discover? If so, should courts make firms bear such
 risks? Are the present strains in corporate and bankruptcy law attribut-
 able to products liability law rules that impose liability on firms for undis-
 in the new code so that a possibility exists that a claim for injuries not yet incurred is
 provable. See, for example, Thomas H. Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to The
 Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. Legal Stud. 73 (1985); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating
 Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1121 (1983); Note, Mass Tort
 Claims and The Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Legislative Compen-
 sation versus The Common-Law Tort System, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 1297 (1983).
 2 An interesting paper that describes the characteristics of toxic substances in consider-
 able detail is Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 Ecology
 L. Q. 207 (1978). See also Symposium, Federal Regulation of the Chemical Industry, 46 L.
 & Contemp. Probs. 1 (C. Schroeder ed. 1983).
 3 Many of Johns-Manville's activities are described in Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass
 Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1984).
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 coverable risks? And if so, how strongly should these strains count
 against those products liability rules? This paper addresses these ques-
 tions.
 Section I defines a "remote" risk as the risk that a product is more
 dangerous than a firm would predict if it had done the cost-effective
 amount of research into safety. A legal rule would impose remote risks on
 firms if it held them liable whenever their products turned out to be less
 safe than expected, even though the firms had researched appropriately
 and warned on the basis of what that research disclosed. Section I argues
 that this rule raises a fairness concern because firms cannot warn about
 danger levels that they cannot reasonably be expected to discover. A
 "knowable" risk is the risk that a product is as dangerous as a firm would
 predict on the basis of doing the cost-effective amount of research, or less
 dangerous. Section I goes on to derive criteria that would enable courts to
 distinguish between remote and knowable risks with acceptable accuracy.
 Section II next shows that to hold firms liable only for failing to warn of
 knowable risks, that is, for failing to disclose what cost-effective research
 would reveal, raises corporate and bankruptcy problems that current law
 largely solves; relatively minor reforms could solve the rest. In contrast,
 imposing remote risks on firms can create difficulties both for the firms
 and for the victims that corporate and bankruptcy law cannot ease, as
 these laws now exist or could be made to exist.4 The fairness concern with
 imposing remote risks that Section I raises, together with the difficulties
 that Section II identifies, suggests that courts should not require firms to
 bear remote risks unless they have compelling instrumental or justice
 reasons to do so. Section III then argues that no one could plausibly have
 such reasons; rather, the victims of remote risks have only a humanitarian
 claim to relief, which society should meet, but not through the vehicle of
 private law suits.5
 4 Imposing risks that firms did not anticipate also produces strains in the civil litigation
 system. An industry has arisen to choose a dispute resolution system best suited to the
 asbestos cases. See, for example, David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Expo-
 sure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 51 (1984); Francis
 McGovern, Management of Multi-Party Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affect-
 ing Case Management (unpublished manuscript, Boston Univ. Law School 1983). The civil
 litigation system is not my concern, but that it is being severely taxed is consistent with the
 view argued for here, that imposing remote risks on firms creates substantial costs for many
 parties and the state.
 5 This paper deals with the problem of remote risks in a general way. It therefore does not
 "solve" the asbestos cases. The asbestos manufacturers may have failed to anticipate the
 asbestos risk or the full advent of strict liability in tort, or both. I am not concerned with
 legal retroactivity. The full reach of strict tort liability is now known, while toxic risks seem
 to be widespread, and many of them may be remote. Thus the more important products
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 I. REMOTE RISKS
 A. Remote Risks and the Law
 Two products liability rules relating to toxic substances exist. Both
 exculpate firms if they warn adequately against the harm that a product
 may cause, but they differ in their definitions of adequacy. One rule holds
 a firm liable if its warning did not correspond to the product's true propen-
 sity to harm, as determined on the basis of hindsight after harm has
 occurred. Under this rule, the firm's knowledge of dangerousness when it
 issued the warning is irrelevant.6 The second rule imposes liability only if
 a firm's warning did not correspond to what the firm knew or should have
 known about dangerousness at the production stage and so focuses atten-
 tion on the firm's ex ante behavior.7 This paper argues that courts should
 use a modified version of the second, ex ante, rule.
 Three objections are made to rules that exculpate firms that warn. One
 holds that warnings about dangerousness cannot be efficaceous. This ob-
 jection may rest on the difficulty of representing in words what really is a
 probability distribution of possible harms, or on notions of cognitive er-
 ror-people may not be able to process or respond sensibly to informa-
 tion about differing likelihoods of personal danger. I will put this objection
 aside, not because it lacks force but because, if it is true, it impeaches any
 disclosure solution to products liability problems; disclosure solutions are
 beyond this paper's scope. Hence I assume that "adequate" warnings
 provide consumers with sufficient information about harm. A second ob-
 jection runs only to the first rule: that rule requires a firm's warning to
 match the product's true degree of dangerousness, and the objection is
 that the rule may require a firm to warn when it could not have warned
 liability question is what courts should do when harms materialize that were difficult to
 anticipate. I do use the asbestos problem paradigmatically, but only because that problem is
 well known and relatively easy to follow. Epstein claimed that the asbestos companies
 legitimately failed to foresee the changes in products liability law. Richard A. Epstein,
 Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, Regulation, September-October 1982,
 at 14. The retroactivity issue is examined in greater detail in Gary T. Schwartz, New
 Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 796, 813-28
 (1983).
 6 Cases that hold the manufacturer's knowledge of risk at the time of production to be
 irrelevant to the imposition of liability are collected in John W. Wade, On the Effect in
 Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 734, 757
 n.83 (1983). See also Louis R. Frumer & Melvin L. Friedman, Products Liability ? 16A
 [4](f)[vi] (1978). An influential early argument for this approach is W. Page Keeton, Products
 Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex. L. Rev. 398 (1970). See also Gary T.
 Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 482-88
 (1979); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69, 93
 (1975).
 7 For example, Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349. 374 NE F, d ARI (Q781R
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 because it would not have known of the danger at production time; requir-
 ing a firm to do what seemingly cannot be done is unfair. The third
 objection runs only to the second rule, which exculpates a firm if its
 warning corresponded to what it should have known about dangerousness
 ex ante. The objection is that it is impossible to apply the standard
 "should have known" in a principled way. Section IA takes up the sec-
 ond and third objections, beginning with the latter.
 One possible way to decide what a firm should have known is to ask
 whether the relevant risk was foreseeable, or "reasonably" foreseeable,
 but this method founders on a well-known description problem: whether a
 risk is foreseeable depends on how it is described, and the choice among
 possible descriptions is arbitrary. For example, the asbestos manufactur-
 ers in the 1930s knew that asbestos caused harm. If the asbestos risk is
 described as "the risk that asbestos is harmful to persons," it was
 foreseeable; indeed, it was foreseen. On the other hand, the manufactur-
 ers seemingly did not know that very grave harms could occur from
 relatively low levels of exposure. If the asbestos risk is described as "the
 risk that asbestos causes the harms that now are seen to result from low
 exposure levels," the risk was difficult to foresee and was perhaps not
 foreseen. No principled way exists to choose between these two descrip-
 tions or others.
 A second way to decide what a firm should have known is to ask, not
 whether a risk was actually appreciated, but whether it was "discov-
 erable" given the level of scientific knowledge at the time.8 This method
 also is arbitrary because it necessarily presupposes a unique set of re-
 search conditions that cannot be isolated in a principled fashion. Was an
 unanticipated risk "discoverable," given then current scientific knowl-
 edge, if it would have been revealed only by a crash government pro-
 gram-an asbestos Manhattan Project? Was a risk discoverable if a com-
 bined industry effort would have revealed it? If a single firm would have,
 had it devoted 20 percent of income to a research effort? Thirty percent?
 The seemingly inevitable arbitrariness involved in distinguishing be-
 tween knowable and unknowable risks has led some commentators to
 argue for the rule that imposes risks on firms regardless of what they knew
 at production time, and some courts have been persuaded.9 Other courts
 8 See, for example, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 439
 (1982); Note, Strict Liability and the Scientifically Unknowable Risk, 97 Marq. L. Rev. 660
 (1974).
 9 See cases cited in the authorities collected in notes 6 and 8, supra. The New Jersey
 Supreme Court recently drew back from Beshada to create a compromise rule: a firm is
 liable only if its warning failed to conform to what it knew or should have known at the time
 of sale, but the firm has the burden of proving that it was justifiably ignorant. See Feldman v.
 Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
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 have allowed juries to impose risks on firms when the evidence suggested
 at most that firms knew a risk existed, rather than that they knew its real
 extent.10 Yet the notion that firms are justifiably ignorant of some risks
 often seems intuitively plausible. No one would expect an aspirin manu-
 facturer to take precautions against the possibility that aspirin will cause
 toes to fall off. Indeed, a rule that exculpates firms for risks of this type is
 implied by widely shared notions of fairness: the aspirin manufacturers
 meant no harm and were not negligent; hence they had no real chance to
 protect themselves against a large liability. If they are required to bear it,
 this must be because their fairness claim should be sacrificed to the state's
 instrumental goals or because it is subordinate to the moral claims of the
 victims. Is it possible, then, to make plausible a distinction between risks
 that should and should not have been anticipated in cases closer than that
 of the aspirin manufacturers? If so, should the manufacturers' fairness
 claim prevail in these closer cases? Section I considers the first of these
 questions.
 Consider this definition: A firm should be considered justifiably igno-
 rant of a risk if the product turns out to be more dangerous than a cost-
 effective research program would have predicted. The risk of such an
 outcome is defined as "remote." This paper's precise claim, then, is that
 courts should adopt a modified version of the second products liability
 rule: a firm should be held liable unless it warned on the basis of what it
 knew or should have known at production time; and it should have known
 the revelations of an optimal research program.
 Making application of the legal rule turn on the concept of a remote risk
 has two virtues. First, this version of the rule eliminates the arbitrariness
 otherwise involved in distinguishing between risks of which firms should
 and should not have been aware. Legal outcomes would be a function of
 measurable entities-the costs of a research program, the nature of the
 injuries known or likely to occur from a product, and so forth. To be sure,
 these entities sometimes may be more measurable in theory than in fact;
 the point rather is that when the distinction between types of risk turns on
 them, it becomes a distinction that is at least drawable in principle. Per-
 haps a better way to say this is to refer to the Learned Hand test in tort
 law, which, put very simply, exculpates a firm when the expected costs of
 avoiding an accident exceed the expected costs of the accident itself. The
 only novelty of the approach suggested here will lie in giving content to
 this test in the research and development context: a risk is remote, put
 very simply, if the expected costs of a research project that might have
 disclosed how dangerous the product actually is exceeded the expected
 1o For example, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
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 gain from knowing this. Second, the modified rule captures the fairness
 claim just described. The addressees of the sanctions that products liabil-
 ity law creates are firms; these firms are known to-indeed are supposed
 to-maximize profits. Hence they will only know what cost-justified in-
 quiries could reveal. To hold them liable for not knowing more is to
 deprive them of a "fair chance" to protect themselves.
 B. A Model of Risk Discoveryll
 Products that create toxic risks hardly ever can be made differently. A
 firm can market a toxic substance with a warning adequate to its danger-
 ousness or not make the substance at all. Often, though, the firm does not
 know how dangerous the substance is. This uncertainty creates difficul-
 ties of two sorts. First, suppose the firm believes that, on average, the
 substance will cause only $1,000 in accident-related harms. Then it could
 sell the substance with no warning or an innocuous warning-"This prod-
 uct may cause harm." Such a strategy is risky because the product could
 in fact be dangerous; in this event, the firm may bear the full cost because,
 under current law, an inadequate warning is treated as no warning at all. 12
 Second, let the firm believe that, on average, the substance will cause
 $5,000,000 in harms. Warnings are cheap to draft and distribute in con-
 trast to this exposure, so the firm could then sell the substance with a
 strong warning: "This product is highly dangerous." Such a strategy is
 risky in a different way, for the substance may turn out to be safe. In this
 " The analysis that follows extends to the liability context. Kevin Roberts & Martin L.
 Weitzman, Funding Criteria for Research, Development and Exploration Projects, 49
 Econometrica 1261 (1981). This is an unusual research and development model because it
 considers the strategy of a single firm. These models are often set in a game-theoretic
 framework, in which a firm does R & D in response to R & D initiatives of its competitors, or
 as a way to exclude rivals from a market, and so forth. See Paul Stoneman, The Economic
 Analysis of Technological Change 30-51 (1983). The Roberts and Weitzman model fits well
 here because toxic substances, by and large, are homogeneous and cannot be altered; hence
 each firm in a market has the same research goal-to learn its product's true characteristics.
 Thus little is lost by beginning with an analysis of a firm in isolation. Section IC then briefly
 extends the analysis to a market context. The analysis here ignores issues of how knowledge
 of risk diffuses across firms, but rather assumes that when one firm discovers a risk's true
 extent, all firms instantaneously know of it. This assumption seems plausible, because a firm
 that discovers a risk ordinarily translates this discovery into the warning it publicly gives;
 firms can conveniently monitor the public warnings of other firms.
 12 A firm is liable for all damages if its warning is not appropriate to the degree of danger.
 See, for example, Salmon v. Parke, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975). The analysis
 below assumes that firms will warn correctly, given what they know, because its concern is
 to see what firms can be expected to know. Cooter's comment to this paper shows that this
 assumption is strong; under strict liability, firms will overwarn. This analysis does not affect
 the results reached here. See Robert Cooter, Defective Warnings, Remote Causes, and
 Bankruptcy: Comment on Schwartz, in this issue.
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 event, the strong warning would lose the firm sales, with no corre-
 sponding gain. The firm, though, has a third choice: rather than warn too
 softly or strongly on inadequate evidence, it could do research into the
 substance's actual dangerousness. If the firm obtained better information
 about how harmful its product was, it could then choose a warning level
 that would be more likely to minimize the losses to it from either over- or
 underwarning. Hence, the gain to a firm from research is the expected
 additional profit it would earn from acting on more rather than less infor-
 mation about product safety.
 If firms were liable whenever they warn inadequately-if firms bear
 remote risks-would they always research until they discovered all
 significant dangers? The answer is no. Rather, the extent to which a firm
 would research a product's dangerousness is a particular function of the
 expected benefits from a research project, the apparent certainty with
 which these benefits would be obtained, and the costs of the research
 program. To begin, a firm faces a distribution of possible profits from its
 product's sale; the firm could earn much or little, depending on how
 suitable to the actual danger its warning is. Distributions commonly are
 characterized by two values, their mean-the average of all outcomes-
 and their standard deviation. Let m be the mean of the possible profit
 distribution from sale of a product whose harm-causing properties are not
 fully known. The size of m is a function of how dangerous the firm per-
 ceives the product to be. To see why, suppose the firm believes the
 product is very dangerous and so gives a strong warning: "This one will
 just about kill you for sure." Then the firm will incur almost no liability
 but make almost no sales; its profits will be low. Let the firm instead omit
 a warning. Then sales will be up but the firm risks incurring large
 liabilities. Hence, whether the firm warns or not, the more dangerous it
 thinks the product is, the lower m will be, for m is the mean of the firm's
 beliefs respecting profitability. And conversely, m will shift up as the firm
 thinks its product is safe, for then it can give a softer warning, thereby
 increasing sales, or can give no warning without risking as much in
 liability.
 The standard deviation measures a distribution's spread; two-thirds of
 the outcomes in a normal distribution-the bell-shaped curve-fall within
 one standard deviation from the mean.13 Thus, the larger is a distribu-
 tion's standard deviation, the wider is its width. Here let cr be the standard
 13 See M. J. Moroney, Facts from Figures 62-63 (1965). The benefit distribution is normal
 if its mean changes roughly continuously with new data, which will occur if small amounts of
 information change beliefs by a small amount. See Roberts & Weitzman, supra note 11, at
 1283. The assumption of a normal distribution seems plausible for many research projects.
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 deviation of the possible profit distribution just described. Then a is a
 measure of the uncertainty under which the firm operates. To say that a
 profit distribution has a large a is to say that the firm is not at all sure just
 how dangerous its product is; profits from production could range from
 negative to large.
 A research project to determine the product's actual dangerousness
 thus has two related functions: it is likely to shrink a, for the spread of the
 profit distribution ordinarily will contract as the firm learns more about
 the product, and research also may shift m, for the mean of possible
 profits will change if new information suggests the product to be more or
 less dangerous than originally thought. Research into products such as
 toxic substances commonly proceeds in stages. At the first stage, the firm
 can perform a relatively inexpensive but low-powered test, such as the
 Ames test for mutagenicity; at the second stage, it can begin animal
 testing; at the third it can commit to a major animal study, and so forth.
 The firm then has five options: (a) not to research at all and not to sell the
 product; (b) not to research at all, but to sell the product and warn on the
 basis of its initial beliefs; (c) to research until completion, defined here as
 finding out precisely how dangerous the substance is; at completion all
 uncertainty respecting harm is removed; (d) to stop the research project
 before completion and not to make the product; (e) to stop the research
 project before completion, make the product, and warn on the basis of
 what it then knows.
 The firm's initial decision problem is whether to begin the research
 project at all; if it begins, the problem becomes whether to proceed to the
 next stage or terminate. This is an "optimal stopping problem," and to
 resolve it the firm needs an "optimal stopping rule." Such a rule max-
 imizes expected benefits minus costs at each stage based on information
 available at that stage, and given that an optimal stopping rule will be used
 at all future stages. Let C be the expected cost to completion of the
 project from any particular stage, and suppose the distribution of benefits
 from research to be distributed normally. Each research stage will dis-
 close a particular benefit mean. Then, we can consider two possible cutoff
 values for this mean. First, there must be an Mhc such that if the mean that
 research discloses, m, is less than or equal to ric, the project should be
 terminated and the product not made. A research result of this sort would
 indicate that the product is apparently so highly toxic that the chance that
 further research will reveal safety is too small to be worth pursuing.
 Second, there must be an mc such that when m - mrhc, the research project should be terminated and the product made. A research result of this sort
 would indicate such a high degree of safety that the chance that further
 research will alter this belief again is not worth pursuing. Then, only when
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 rc < m < ihc should the firm continue to research. At each stage-for
 each value of C-an ric and an thc exist, so an optimal stopping function
 also exists. The firm can therefore calculate the expected net value of a
 research project at any stage as a function of m and C. Thus we can write
 a valuation function for a project, V(mc, C), that gives the project's value
 when an optimal stopping rule is followed.
 The operation of the optimal stopping rule and the valuation function
 can be clarified with a picture (Figure 1). The vertical axis plots the set of
 possible benefit means that research discloses. The horizontal axis plots
 the successive stages of research. These stages are measured from left to
 right, so increased expenditures on research move the firm toward the
 vertical axis. Points W, X, Y, and Z each represent estimates of expected
 profitability that various levels of research expenditure generate. A point
 on the vertical axis (C = 0) represents perfect knowledge of dangerous-
 ness and thus profits from sales. The two rays, mc and Mhc, are "optimal
 stopping lines"; each of them plots the set of cutoff points that tell the
 firm when further research is not worthwhile.
 Figure 1 shows that it pays to stop researching when the expected
 profits from sale become high or low relative to the amount of additional
 research available to the firm. For example, let a firm's initial estimate of
 profitability be at point W. There r^c < m < mtc, so the firm will begin a
 research project. If early results reveal a profit mean such as X, the firm
 will continue to research. But if further results reveal that the firm is at
 points Y or Z, the firm would terminate the research project. At Y, which
 is above the positive optimal stopping line, the likelihood that further
 research would reveal serious danger-unprofitability-is so low that the
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 firm's best strategy is to market the product, warning on the basis of what
 it then knows. At Z, the product is so likely to be highly dangerous that
 the firm's best strategy is not to make it at all.
 Figure 1 also shows that firms will almost never have perfect knowledge
 about safety; research results will cause a firm to hit one or the other
 optimal stopping line before the vertical axis is reached. This result is
 consistent with experience. Perfect knowledge about the harm-causing
 propensities of complex products, such as toxic substances, simply does
 not exist. For example, scientists now identify actual carcinogens by
 observing how substances affect animals and persons, not from theories
 that predict dangerousness from the substances' chemical structure. The
 former method cannot yield certain answers when applied to new prod-
 ucts.
 The two optimal stopping lines in Figure 1 are represented as rays out
 of the origin. To see why this is so, recall that I wrote a valuation function
 for a research project, V(mc, C), that gives its value when an optimal
 stopping rule is followed. This valuation function is an expected monetary
 value that is measured in the same units as m, C, and V.'4 Research and
 development models commonly assume constant marginal rates of sub-
 stitution between research inputs and outputs;"5 for example, if inputs
 into research are doubled, research output doubles also. This means here
 that u shrinks in direct proportion to the costs incurred in research. Now
 the valuation function for a project with constant returns is linearly homo-
 geneous-a straight line. Then for a fixed u we can write V in the func-
 tional form: V(m, C) = mg(m/C), which is linear.16 We can let rc/IC = R
 and ihc/C = S and solve for the optimal stopping function: this function
 will actually consist of two rays out of the origin-the "optimal stopping
 lines"-which are r^c = RC for all R and tc = SC for all S. These lines
 have slopes of R and S, respectively.
 14 This paragraph is fairly technical. Readers uninterested in the derivation of the optimal
 stopping lines can move to the next paragraph without losing the sense of the argument.
 15 See Stoneman, supra note 11, at 4.
 16 A production function is homogeneous of degree k if, given any positive constant t,
 F(tK, tL) = tkF(K, L). There are increasing returns to scale when k is greater than one,
 decreasing returns when k is less than one. With constant returns to scale k = 1, and so
 F(tK, tL) = tF(K, L). A function that has constant returns to scale is linearly homoge-
 neous. We have assumed that the production function for a research project, V(m, C), is
 linearly homogeneous, and sowe can substitute m for K, C for L, and X for t and write: V(m,
 C) = XV(m/X, C/X) for all X > 0, where h is a positive constant. Because this equation holds
 for all values of X > 0, we can let X = C. Then V(m, C) = CV(mIC, 1). Define g(m/C) = (C/
 m)V(m/C, 1). Solving this yields mg(m/C) = CV(mIC, 1). But we know that CV(mIC, 1) =
 V(m, C). Hence, V(m, C) = mg(m/C), which is the equation in the text. Because V(m, C) is
 linearly homogeneous, it describes a ray through the origin.
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 FIGURE 2
 Figure 1 shows that the slopes of the optimal stopping lines are impor-
 tant determinants of how much research is done. For example, the
 smaller is S in Figure 1, the flatter is the positive optimal stopping line,
 and the more likely is the firm to sell without doing very much research.
 As another illustration, observe Figure 2, in which only positive values of
 m are considered. Because S is so small, points W, X, and Y from Figure 1
 lie above the optimal stopping line; if the firm is at any such point, it will
 sell without doing further research. Research would be done were the firm
 at point Z, but then the benefit mean must be low-that is, early research
 would indicate a relatively high likelihood of danger.
 The slope, S, turns out to vary directly with the standard deviation of
 possible benefits, u, and to vary inversely with research costs, C.17 This
 result is intuitively plausible. When u is high, considerable uncertainty
 about a product exists, so the firm has an incentive to research; and when
 C is low, research is inexpensive, so again the firm is likely to do it. But if
 the firm perceives u to be small or C to be high, and the product has a
 good chance of being profitable, the firm's best strategy is to sell it with-
 out full research; in this circumstance, S is then small, so the world looks
 to the firm like Figure 2. To summarize, the model shows that the amount
 17 Roberts and Weitzman first show that what we have called the slope parameters R and
 S are symmetrical about the horizontal axis with S = - R. As these are probability distribu-
 tions, it can be shown that 1 = g(S) - g(R) and, by a fairly complex mathematical analysis,
 it turns out that
 1=E(Z|Z :S) pr(Z>S)
 1 =E(Z S) 1 - 2pr(Z - S) '
 where Z - N(cr, -2) and & = dc/C. Doing comparative statics shows that S increases when
 a increases or when C decreases. See Roberts & Weitzman, supra note 11, at 1285-86, 1270.
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 of research a profit-maximizing firm will do to discover how dangerous a
 product is depends on three variables: the mean of the profit distribution if
 the firm were to sell without doing further research; the variance of this
 distribution-the amount of uncertainty about dangerousness; and re-
 search costs.
 These criteria may illuminate the asbestos cases. The asbestos com-
 panies issued mild warnings to their own workers but warned no one else,
 nor did they perform tests to determine the actual harm that asbestos
 could cause.18 In the 1920s and 1930s, asbestos was thought to cause
 asbestosis, a serious but not invariably fatal disease. Persons thought to
 be at risk worked in asbestos "textile" factories-firms that manufac-
 tured asbestos. These workers were covered under workers' compensa-
 tion laws. Because asbestosis was thought to be caused only at high
 exposure levels, workers in other industries, such as those who installed
 asbestos in ships or buildings, were assumed not to be at risk. 19 Hence, a
 firm that failed to warn strongly could believe its expected tort liability
 from asbestos sales to be manageable. That is, the mean of the possible
 profit distribution from selling asbestos without perfect knowledge of its
 dangerousness was relatively high.
 Firms could have held their view of this mean with relative certainty.
 This possibility follows from an analysis of government regulations con-
 cerning permissible amounts of asbestos in work environments. These
 regulations were unchanged between the late 1930s and the late 1960s.
 The first recommended government standard for permissible amounts of
 asbestos in work environments was adopted in 1938. This standard lasted
 for thirty years, though it was much more lenient than the current stan-
 dard. The static nature of the rule implies that little uncertainty existed
 respecting it. In 1968, the federal standard was lowered considerably for
 government contractors, to twelve fibers per cubic centimeter. In 1972,
 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) adopted a
 standard of five fibers per cubic centimeter, which was "intended primar-
 ily to protect employees against asbestosis"; "it was hoped that [the
 standard] would provide some incidental degree of protection against
 cancer." The agency did not regulate more rigorously for cancer preven-
 tion because the relation between asbestos and cancer was then too ob-
 scure. In 1976, OSHA reduced the standard to two fibers per cubic centi-
 meter. All of these standards were too lax, but government scientists then
 believed that the smaller fibers (as small as one micron) would not be
 18 See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
 19 See id.
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 retained in the lungs and therefore would not cause asbestosis. These
 shorter fibers are now known to cause asbestosis and cancer. In 1975,
 OSHA proposed a reduction in the 1972 standard to .5 fibers per cubic
 centimeter; that is, by the mid-1970s the 1972 standard was considered to
 be too lenient by a factor of ten and the 1968 standard was considered too
 lenient by a factor of twenty-four. Both standards were very much stricter
 than the 1938 standard. After a struggle with the Supreme Court, OSHA
 promulgated the .5 fiber standard as an "Emergency Temporary Stan-
 dard," effective November 4, 1983.20 Thus firms in the period ending
 approximately 1958 may have held their view of the high profit mean with
 relative certainty, which is to say that the spread of possible profits from
 the sale of asbestos, u, probably was perceived as small.
 Finally, laboratory testing of carcinogenic substances neither was then
 nor is now well developed, nor are results from animals easily extrapo-
 lated to human beings. It is not surprising that the true extent of the
 asbestos disaster was revealed only by a retrospective study of workers
 who had been heavily exposed in similar circumstances.21 An asbestos
 manufacturer would have had great difficulty conducting a retrospective
 study of workers whom it did not employ and whose exposure experi-
 ences differed widely among industries; and prospective tests for poten-
 tially carcinogenic substances are notoriously hard to do.22 Thus, for a
 given firm, the costs of a project researching the dangers of asbestos, C,
 were likely to be high.
 The model just set forth shows that when u is small and m and C are
 20 Documentation for this paragraph may be found in 78 Fed. Reg. 5108b and following (4
 November, 1983); Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Not Yet Settled, 7 Ford-
 ham Urb. L. J. 55 (1978); Gary Treiger, Relief for Asbestos Victims: A Legislative Analysis,
 20 Harv. J. Legis. 179, 192-96 (1983). Richard Epstein also argued that the asbestos com-
 panies did not know the full extent of the asbestos risk. See Epstein, supra note 5. For a
 contrary view, see Ronald Glotta & Janette Sherman, Learning from the Lessons of the
 Asbestos Tragedy: A Reform Proposal, 19 Trial 68 (No. 11, 1983) ("Sufficient scientific
 information existed no later than 1941 to avoid the 'asbestos tragedy.' " Id at 70). Two cases
 have affirmed jury verdicts imposing punitive damages on asbetos companies. Moran v.
 Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines,
 Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982). These cases erroneously equate full information with
 knowledge that a product may be dangerous, apparently because they believe it to be
 unpardonable not to research fully or warn scaringly when one knows that (an unspecified
 amount of) harm might occur.
 21 This is the famous Selikoff study, which is described in authorities cited in note 20
 supra.
 22 The difficulties of testing for carcinogenity are well described in Stephen Breyer, Regu-
 lation and Its Reform 135-41 (1982); Milton C. Weinstein, Decision Making for Toxic
 Substances Control: Cost-Effective Information Development for the Control of Environ-
 mental Carcinogens, 27 Pub. Pol'y 333 (1979).
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 high, firms are likely to warn weakly and do little research, even when
 they are required to bear all risks. Section IC next shows that the model
 also applies when firms operate under a rule that requires them to warn
 only of risks of which they should have been aware. The asbestos manu-
 facturers operated under a rule much like this in the 1930s and 1940s. That
 they acted in the way the model predicts-issuing weak warnings and not
 conducting tests-is therefore unsurprising. The asbestos risk may have
 been remote.
 The model used here supposed a particular kind of research project,
 one that was conducted in stages and whose outcomes were normally
 distributed. Other kinds of projects are plainly possible. For example,
 research results sometimes are discontinuous; sudden breakthroughs oc-
 cur. I have said nothing formal about research projects of this sort. The
 exercise here should be regarded more as an invitation to construct a
 family of models relevant to the toxic risk problem than as a complete
 description of the toxic risk research process. Nevertheless, many real
 research projects approximate the conditions of the model, and the con-
 duct of most projects is likely to be a function of the mean of expected
 benefits, the distribution of that mean and the costs of research, interact-
 ing much as the model describes.
 C. Lessons
 In the model, firms bore remote risks; a firm knew it would be liable
 whenever its warning was inadequate to a product's actual dangerous-
 ness. The analysis implied that a substantial set of risks would remain
 incorrectly estimated under this assumption. A safety-based justification
 for imposing remote risks on firms must then be that the set of underes-
 timated risks would grow were firms required only to warn of what they
 actually knew or of what optimal inquiries would disclose. This justifica-
 tion is false if decision makers can ascertain the criteria, developed
 above, that determine the optimal research program. To see why, let a
 firm believe that (i) it will be held liable only for failing to warn concerning
 risks whose value it knows or can optimally discover; (ii) a court or jury
 will later decide independently what the scope of an optimal inquiry was;
 (iii) the court or jury can determine the precise values of m, U, and C as
 the firm did or should have viewed them ex ante. In these circumstances,
 the firm will research only when and for as long as the three decision
 variables m, u, and C direct it to; were the firm to do less, the court or jury
 would hold it liable, and the firm could not do more. The oversight func-
 tion of the court and jury, that is, induces the firm to behave optimally on
 the basis of what it knows, which is just the behavior the model describes.
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 Therefore, imposing only knowable risks on firms cannot reduce the set of
 risks that firms will discover; the modified second liability rule described
 in Section IA should govern.
 Next, consider two objections to this conclusion. The first supposes the
 full set of ex ante research opportunities to be private information to
 firms. A rule imposing only knowable risks would then create disincen-
 tives to research fully: a firm might ignore low-cost research opportunities
 with a high likelihood of revealing dangerousness; instead, it would sell
 the product with a weak warning, claiming when it was sued that the only
 research opportunities open to it were so costly that the failure to pursue
 them was efficient. If the full set of research opportunities actually is
 private information to firms, plaintiffs could not disprove these claims. In
 contrast, holding firms liable on the basis of what is known ex post would
 eliminate the incentive of firms to forgo and later conceal the existence of
 efficacious low-cost research techniques.
 This objection is unpersuasive because the research opportunities at
 issue actually are public knowledge. These "opportunities" entail using
 standard medical tests that increase knowledge of such health hazards as
 carcinogenicity. The circumstances under which any of these tests will do
 this and their cost are common knowledge in the medical community at
 any given time. Consequently, the issue in the cases I discuss is not
 whether a defendant firm had opportunities to do research but whether it
 should have exploited more fully the research opportunities that were
 available to all firms. This issue seems easier for a plaintiff to litigate than
 the analogous issue in the typical design defect case-whether defendant
 had available to it, or could have developed, an alternative, safer product
 design. Therefore a rule imposing only knowable risks on firms will not
 create disincentives to research stemming from a supposed inability of
 plaintiffs to establish that potentially useful research opportunities existed
 ex ante; there is no such inability.
 A second objection to my claim that forgoing remote risk impositions
 creates no disincentives to research seemingly follows from the correct
 view that decision makers could reconstruct the other decision variables,
 u and m, only to a rough approximation. To the extent that this difficulty
 exists, however, firms will be induced to pursue excessive rather than
 inadequate research programs. To see why, one should realize that when
 these variables cannot be measured precisely, the decision maker may
 err. Thus, if courts seek to impose only knowable risks on firms, a firm
 nevertheless faces a positive probability of bearing a remote risk; it may
 be found liable for an inadequate warning though it acted optimally in not
 discovering the product's actual dangerousness. For toxic substances,
 this liability may be large. Also, the probability that the firm will incur
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 liability is partly a function of the amount of research that it does; for if
 the decision variables cannot be measured precisely, the firm's ex post
 claim to have behaved optimally is the more persuasive, the more re-
 search it actually did. When a firm faces a positive probability of being
 found liable even though it behaved optimally, this liability is large, and
 its likelihood is partly a function of the firm's own behavior, then the firm
 has an incentive to be more careful than a cost-benefit calculation alone
 would dictate.23 In our terms, a firm will do more research than would be
 optimal if courts and juries could measure m and u exactly.
 It may be thought, then, that an efficiency justification for imposing
 remote risks on firms is not that this would prevent insufficient research
 into toxic risks but that it would prevent too much. Were all risks imposed
 on firms, a particular firm's liability would no longer be a function of how
 much research it actually did; hence, it would do only the optimal
 amount. On the other hand, imposing remote risks increases the uncer-
 tainty under which firms must function and may unduly restrict the num-
 ber of firms. The public-good aspect of research also causes firms to do
 too little of it; consequently, whatever excess research is induced by the
 rule argued for is a useful counterweight.24 Finally, Section II shows that
 imposing remote risks on firms will cause significant economic disloca-
 tions should those risks materialize. Efficiency concerns therefore do not
 imply holding firms liable for remote risks.
 II. CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND BANKRUPTCY
 Analyses of the relationship among tort, corporate, and bankruptcy law
 do not distinguish between remote and knowable risks. This failure under-
 lies much of the difficulty that the latter two bodies of law have experi-
 23 This analysis derives from John Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncer-
 tainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984). A similar analysis is
 made in Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79
 (1982).
 24 Research into safety has a public-good aspect because a firm that does the research will
 then issue profit-maximizing warnings; these warnings are public and can be copied by other
 firms. Steven Shavell also points out that research into risk has a public-good aspect and
 concludes that when this aspect is important, the government should do much of the re-
 search. See Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357
 (1984). See also John M. Hartwick, Optimal R & D Levels When Firm j Benefits from Firm
 i's Inventive Activity, 16 Econ. Letters 165 (1984). This view is correct; the text argues only
 that a "negligence" standard can ameliorate the public-good problem, not eliminate it.
 Finally, imposing remote risks may be thought desirable because it would cause firms to
 develop tests that predict dangerousness better. This argument seems fanciful because such
 tests are parasitic on basic research into the fundamental nature of disease; private firms
 rarely, if ever, do such basic research.
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 enced in dealing with situations such as the asbestos cases. Section IIA
 thus puts remote risks aside to consider the corporate and bankruptcy
 aspects of knowable risk impositions. It shows that when risks are know-
 able, in the sense developed in Section I, the law now makes it difficult for
 firms to shift risks they can more cheaply bear or to avoid paying valid
 claims. Further, legal reforms that would altogether preclude these forms
 of misbehavior are relatively convenient to adopt. Such reforms include
 reducing the protection that limited liability confers on firm owners; in-
 creasing the reach of the successor liability doctrine; and preventing firms
 from discharging in bankruptcy claims based on injuries that have yet to
 arise. Section IIB then returns to the remote risk concern to show that
 imposing remote risks on firms creates two related difficulties: first, vic-
 tims often will be undercompensated; second, firms will attempt to avoid
 liability, and their efforts will cause substantial welfare losses. Current
 corporate and bankruptcy laws deal badly with these difficulties but
 neither the reforms just discussed nor others would help. The most impor-
 tant factor that drives the analysis Section II makes is that firms generally
 will or can be induced to insure against knowable risks or not to operate,
 while firms will not insure remote risks to their full extent. To summarize,
 Section II argues that, when corporate and bankruptcy law aspects are
 considered, remote risk impositions not only may be unfair, as Section IA
 suggested, but also will frustrate the law's compensation and efficiency
 goals.
 A. Knowable Risks and the Externalization Problem
 1. The Delayed Risk Concern
 Persons and firms who insure fully against the accidents they may cause
 obviously can compensate victims. Also, although a person or firm who
 insures fully does not necessarily face the correct incentives to take
 care,25 reducing the incentive to insure by excusing actors from the full
 costs of the accidents they cause is unsound. Nonetheless, the law creates
 incentives not to insure fully. Accident victims can draw primarily on an
 individual tortfeasor's tangible wealth to satisfy tort judgments entered
 against him, yet when claims exceed tangible wealth, victims cannot also
 draw on the tortfeasor's human capital by forcing him to devote a fraction
 25 If a firm can influence the probability that a loss of given magnitude will occur without
 also influencing that magnitude, purchasing insurance creates a moral hazard problem; the
 firm is covered against all loss no matter how much care it takes, so it has an incentive to
 take little care. The moral hazard problem disappears if insurance companies can monitor
 care.
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 TABLE 1
 EFFECTIVE INSURANCE COST OF PROTECTING WEALTH
 Effective
 Tangible Price per
 Wealth that Largest Premium Total Dollar of
 Insurance Expected Coverage per Dollar Premium Protection
 Protects ($) Liability ($) Purchased ($) of Coverage (3) x (4) (5) + (1)
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 10,000 5,000 5,000 .05 250 .05
 10,000 10,000 10,000 .05 500 .05
 10,000 20,000 20,000 .05 1,000 .10
 10,000 40,000 40,000 .05 2,000 .20
 10,000 80,000 80,000 .05 4,000 .40
 of his future earning capacity to paying compensation. Indeed, a bank-
 ruptcy option exists: when liability judgments exceed tangible wealth, the
 defendant can offer up only that wealth and then have tort judgments
 discharged in bankruptcy. Hence individuals have a form of limited liabil-
 ity, which dilutes their incentive to insure fully when the largest expected
 liability they face exceeds their tangible wealth.
 To see how this dilution functions, suppose that Jones has $10,000 in
 wealth and faces a linear insurance premium schedule, where $.05 buys
 $1.00 of coverage no matter how much coverage is taken. Then consider
 Table 1. Because the tangible wealth that insurance protects remains
 constant while the premium necessary to protect this wealth rises with
 coverage purchased, the price per dollar of actual protection also must
 rise: in the illustration, when the largest expected liability is fifty percent
 of tangible wealth, the price of protecting a dollar of this wealth is $.05;
 when the largest expected liability is four times tangible wealth, the price
 rises to $.20. Given limited liability, the incentive to insure thus varies
 inversely with (a) the difference between the largest possible liability and
 tangible personal wealth and (b) the probability that liabilities significantly
 exceeding tangible wealth will be incurred. Respecting this second factor,
 when the probability of such large liabilities is high, Jones will believe
 herself likely to be in the state where insurance is relatively expensive per
 dollar of protection, and so she has a lessened incentive to insure. On the
 other hand, if she does not insure, she may actually become bankrupt.
 Persons dislike bankruptcy and strive to avoid it. Consequently, Jones
 faces conflicting incentives about whether to insure fully when the largest
 liability she may cause exceeds her tangible wealth.
 A recent paper on the decision to purchase automobile liability insur-
 ance showed that a person will insure if the premium he would pay to
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 equalize his income in all possible future states of the world exceeds the
 expected value of the uncollectible claims against him if he purchases no
 insurance.26 Thus, if the largest expected liability in the illustration above
 were $20,000 and would be incurred with a probability of .01, Jones would
 insure if she valued never being bankrupt at more than $100:.01 ($20,000-
 $10,000). In formal terms, let L equal the largest liability against Jones if
 she negligently injures another and let W be Jones's wealth. Then let P be
 the premium she would be willing to pay to avoid bankruptcy and p be the
 probability that L is incurred. The expected value, e, of uncollectible
 claims above Jones's wealth is then p(L - W) = e, and Jones will insure
 against L if P > e. This model shows that the likelihood of purchasing
 insurance for an individual varies directly with the amount of wealth a
 person has (W) and his desire to keep it (P), and varies inversely with the
 probability of a crushing accident (p) and its size (L) in relation to one's
 wealth. To return to the illustration, when p is high and L - W is large, e
 also will be large. The larger e is, the less likely it is that P > e, and so the
 less likely it is that Jones would purchase full insurance. The data show
 that approximately 20 percent of persons either fail to insure or underin-
 sure for automobile accidents.27
 A difficulty with this model is that the risk premium, P, is unspecified; it
 is just a function of risk aversion. But P can be given more content if we
 26 See William R. Keeton & Evan Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the
 Underinsured Driver Problem, 27 J. Law & Econ. 149 (1984).
 27 The data are ambiguous because they do not account for people's risk perceptions. For
 example, if people underestimate the likelihood that they will injure others, they may buy
 too little insurance; the converse holds if they overestimate this risk. Hence it is difficult to
 isolate the contribution of "limited liability" to people's decision to insure. That contribu-
 tion is unlikely to be zero, though. Results similar to those that Keeton and Kwerel derive
 are found in Gur Huberman, David Mayers, & Clifford W. Smith, Optimal Insurance Policy
 Indemnity Schedules, 14 Bell J. Econ. 415 (1983). These authors call attention to the role of
 bankruptcy exemptions, which allow a person to retain substantial tangible wealth-two
 cars and a house, sometimes--though he declares bankruptcy. They then show that when
 the largest possible liability is high in relation to wealth, purchasing less than full insurance
 though risking bankruptcy may generate greater expected utility than paying large insurance
 premiums. The only paper I have seen that considers a corporation's demand for insur-
 ance is David Mayers & Clifford W. Smith, On the Corporate Demand for Insurance, 52 J.
 Bus. 281 (1982). These authors attribute the demand for liability insurance to insurance
 company efficiencies in settling claims and, relative to creditors, in monitoring firm behav-
 ior. Respecting the latter, a firm may lower its interest rate on loans retroactively by adopt-
 ing projects with a high risk of causing harm after it borrows. Interest rates will reflect this
 possibility. The existence of liability insurance, however, signals to lenders that insurance
 companies are monitoring to prevent such misbehavior and so keeps interest rates down.
 The difficulty here is that there appears to be no way to specify how much insurance on
 activities that firms have yet to perform would constitute an adequate signal. Put more
 simply, Mayers and Smith do not address the question the text next takes up, which is how
 much insurance it is optimal for firms to buy.
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 consider an entrepreneur deciding whether to begin a corporation that will
 have limited liability. This is because for a firm, unlike a private person,
 future existence (and hence all future earnings) depend on avoiding bank-
 ruptcy. Much of the wealth of individuals is their human capital, their
 ability to work productively, which they retain after bankruptcy. In con-
 trast, a bankrupt firm must cease operations, for its wealth is largely its
 physical capital, which creditors can take. Firms are valued as perpetu-
 ities: if I equals net expected earnings per year and r is the firm's cost of
 capital,28 the value of a firm's earnings in perpetuity, V, is equal to I/r. An
 entrepreneur who insures his firm against liabilities, even when those
 liabilities could exceed the firm's assets, thus secures I/r always. The risk
 premium for an entrepreneur thus depends importantly on his firm's ex-
 pected future earnings; the higher they are in relation to the wealth that
 must be contributed to begin the firm, the more likely is the firm to be fully
 insured, even against liabilities that will exceed this wealth.
 This analysis has two useful implications. First, when a risk is know-
 able, an entrepreneur who sets up a manufacturing firm is likely to have it
 insure fully, despite the existence of limited liability. This follows, first,
 because such firms commonly possess substantial wealth in the form of
 physical capital and, second, because entrepreneurs will expect to earn a
 significantly higher return on this wealth than the risk-free return-the
 rate on Treasury bills. Otherwise, it is pointless to start the firm. When
 wealth is high, expected income thus is high in absolute terms. And when
 a firm has substantial wealth that is at risk to victims and earns a high
 income, it is likely to insure fully, unless its liability exposure greatly
 exceeds its wealth.
 This analysis also suggests that when it pays not to insure fully, it often
 will pay not to operate the firm at all. A firm is less likely to insure when
 the probability of an accident (p) is high, it does not earn a large income,
 and its liability exposure is very high in relation to its wealth. But when p
 is high, a substantial chance exists that crushing accident costs will mate-
 rialize early, thereby providing the firm with only a brief period in which
 to recover start-up costs and earn a profit. If its income is not large, this
 period will be too brief. For example, suppose that a firm requires
 $100,000 of wealth to begin; it will earn a relatively high net income on
 investment of $15,000 a year; its discount rate is .10; its assets depreciate
 at a real rate of 10 percent a year; accident costs that greatly exceed the
 28 When a firm is deciding whether to do a project that will generate income in the future,
 it must discount that income to present value to compare it with the present costs of
 beginning the project. A firm's "cost of capital" is the discount rate it uses. This rate
 increases with the project's riskiness and the cost of money generally.
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 firm's wealth will materialize in the very beginning of the third year, and it
 does not pay the firm to insure. Then the expected value to an entrepre-
 neur of operating the firm without insurance is negative by more than
 $30,000.29 The entrepreneur will not insure his firm against all accident
 costs, but will not begin it either. Therefore, when risks are knowable,
 manufacturing firms will generally insure fully or not operate.30
 An exception to this conclusion may exist if accident costs are likely
 not to materialize for several years after start-up. Let an entrepreneur
 expect his firm to incur no accident costs for five years; in years six to
 infinity, accidents will happen, and in each of these years a positive prob-
 ability will exist of incurring a liability that will exceed the firm's wealth.
 If it does not pay to insure, the entrepreneur nevertheless would operate if
 he could earn enough in the accident-free period to recover start-up costs
 and make a profit. That the risk of accidents is delayed is significant
 because, other things equal, the longer the accident-free period, the more
 likely it is that the strategy of operating without insurance will be
 profitable.
 Operation of a firm without insurance when its potential liabilities ex-
 ceed its assets is plainly undesirable because the firm externalizes risk to
 victims. The entrepreneur, when deciding what products to make, will not
 compare the accident costs of victims to the expected gains, but rather
 will compare only the value of the firm's wealth to those gains. As this
 wealth, by definition, is less than the victims' costs, entreprenuers may
 produce too many defective products. Also, when entrepreneurs operate
 firms in a delayed risk context and do not insure, those firms often will
 have negative value; that is, the firms could not earn enough to justify
 29 The firm's value in the text is computed by solving
 I I W
 V- +
 (1 + r) (1 + r)2 (1 + r)3'
 where V = firm value. The text gives only an approximate answer because, as the model in
 Section IIA2 next shows, this formula is not exactly right. But on the text's assumptions,
 that model also shows that the contemplated firm would actually have a substantial negative
 value were it valued precisely.
 30 Other firms sometimes may operate without insurance. For example, in the famous
 case of Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 236 (N.Y. 1966), an entrepreneur set up separately
 incorporated companies, each of which had as its sole asset two taxicabs; these little com-
 panies then purchased the minimum insurance that the law allowed. This result is unsurpris-
 ing. Each "firm" had a relatively small amount of wealth at risk to victims-two cabs; it
 could incur a liability well in excess of this value; and the income of two cabs is not large
 relative to the highest damage judgments that could be rendered. In these circumstances, a
 firm may have an incentive to operate without insurance. As Section IIA2 will show, in these
 circumstances courts also should pierce the corporate veil to hold the owner personally
 liable. The New York Court did not do this and so erred.
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 operation if the firms could not externalize risk but instead had to bear it.
 Operation of negative value firms is undesirable because these firms gen-
 erate social costs that exceed their social gains. Thus, it is important to
 ask whether corporate and bankruptcy laws actually do permit entrepre-
 neurs to externalize risk to victims and to operate negative value firms, by
 establishing companies that function without insurance and then dissolve
 when accidents happen.
 Section IIA2 models the decision of an entrepreneur considering
 whether to establish a firm in a delayed risk context and, if so, whether to
 insure against the accidents the firm may cause. It formally derives the
 conclusions that were just set out intuitively. Readers who dislike models
 may move to the legal discussion in subsection 3 without losing the
 thread.
 2. A Limited Liability Risk Avoidance Model
 The model assumes that (a) an entrepreneur, who may be a firm, wants
 to maximize the expected value of a business that will make a product; (b)
 the product causes injuries to users some years after sale; (c) the entrepre-
 neur and insurance companies know this but consumers and workers do
 not; (d) the business that makes the product will not warn adequately
 against its risk; (e) a probability exists that the firm will incur a liability
 that exceeds its wealth in any year after the accident-free period ends; (f)
 insurance premiums are actuarily fair; the insurance company earns zero
 profits; (g) limited liability exists; (h) successor liability does not exist; a
 purchaser of the firm's assets is not liable for its torts; and (i) contingent
 tort claims are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. The model uses the fol-
 lowing notation: I = a firm's expected net income per year; V = net
 present value of the firm; r = firm's discount rate; W = firm's wealth; t =
 number of years the firm can operate before it must begin to pay products
 liability costs; L = largest liability it faces from accidents; p = probabil-
 ity that accidents in the amount of L will be incurred.
 In the accident-free period, the firm earns income, valued at V I/(1 +
 r)'. After this period, the firm will earn income in each year with probabil-
 ity 1 - p and earn no income while losing all wealth with probability p (L
 is then incurred). It can be shown31 that the value to the firm of operating
 in the years when accidents can happen is [I - p(I + W)]/[(r + p)(l +
 r)t]. Hence, we can write the value of the firm without insurance as
 " The equation the text next gives is the solution to the problem of valuing the firm as an
 infinite series, in each year of which it will disappear with probability p and continue for
 another period with probability (1 - p).
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Mon, 18 Sep 2017 23:44:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 712 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
 VW t I + I-p(I-W) w = + . (1)
 o (1 + r)t (r + p)(1 + r)t
 If a firm insures fully, its income is constant over all future states of the
 world. Hence, its value is
 pL
 I r VI (2)
 (1 + r)t+ (2)
 The second term is the present discounted value of a stream of insurance
 payments that must be paid beginning in the year t + 1; each payme t
 equals the risk (pL) of incurring liability.
 The firm's strategy turns on a comparison of these values. If V, > Vw
 and VI is greater than the value the resources at issue would have in
 a other use, the firm will operate with insurance; if V, < V  an  Vw is the
 highest-valued use of the resources, the firm will operate without insur-
 ance. Otherwise, the firm will not operate. It is useful to compare VI and
 Vw.
 pL t I r j< I I - p(I + W)
 /(+ +(3) r (1 + r)1 (1 + r) (r + p)(1 +r)t
 Rearranging terms, we get
 I[(1 + r)(1 - r)p - r(1 + r)t+l(r + p)]  rp[L(r + p) - (1 + r)W].
 (4)
 By inspection of (4), we see that the right hand side, Vw, will be negative if
 L < W, for L is weighted by (r + p), which always is less than (1 + r), the
 weighting factor for W. This says that if the largest expected liability a
 firm faces (L) is less than the firm's wealth (W), it will never pay the firm
 to operate without insurance; the firm will either insure fully or not exist.
 When L > W, the right-hand side is likely to exceed the left-hand side, VI,
 if (i) (L - W) is large; (ii) p is high; (iii) t is long; and (iv) I is large when t is
 long. The intuition underlying the first two conditions has been set out
 above. Respecting the third, the longer the accident free period (t), the
 more likely the entrepreneur is to recover the wealth contributed to the
 firm and earn a profit-and the less likely the entrepreneur is to have
 the firm insure, for insurance is bought to protect W so that income (I) is
 earned. The desire for insurance is weakened a fortiori if I also is large
 when t is long, which condition iv states. Further, by inspection of equa-
 tions (3) and (4) we see that Vw is likely to exceed zero when W is small.
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 This says that the less wealth the entrepreneur must put at risk to victims,
 the more likely is operation without insurance to be its best strategy.32
 These inequalities also reveal a striking fact: it can be that V, < 0 while
 Vw > 0. In this event, the existence of limited liability and delayed risk
 permit an entrepreneur to operate a negative value firm. Such a firm
 generates social costs that exceed its social gains, for V, < 0 only when
 the present value of the firm's income stream is less than the present value
 of the liability risks it creates.
 In many cases, when V, is less than Vw and Vw is positive, V, will be
 negative; it is profit maximizing to operate without insurance though the
 firm could not survive if it had to take account of all risks that it creates.
 Consider this illustration: I = $10,000; r = .10; L = $200,000; W =
 $150,000; p = .10; t = 5. Then,
 pL
 V I r = - $12,994.35.
 r (1 + r)t+l
 Vw Ip( + W) $19,184.67.
 0 (1 + r)t (r + p)(1 + r)t
 The expected value to an entrepreneur of operating a firm without in-
 surance is positive (Vw > 0), but the firm has negative value, all costs
 considered. This firm should not operate, however, for two reasons: it
 externalizes risk to victims because its liability exposure exceeds its
 wealth, and it could not pay its way were it made to bear full liability costs
 ( VI< 0).
 It is also useful to focus on W, the firm's wealth. In many cases, includ-
 ing those involving toxic products, no single suit will be for an amount
 32 This paper discusses primarily products that cannot be made safer. In a majority of
 jurisdictions, a firm is held liable for the damages such "unavoidably dangerous" products
 cause only if the firm fails to warn adequately. Therefore, for such products a warning and
 full insurance are substitutes. The possibility that a firm could warn rather than insure does
 not affect the text's analysis. A warning is exculpatory because it conveys full information.
 Since that is hard to do, firms that warn in fact face positive probabilities that courts will not
 enforce their warnings. The risk that a firm that issues a warning will bear L is thus not pL
 but p ? p'L, where p' is the probability that a court will find the firm's warning to be inadequate. If we let p - p' = b and substitute b for p, the analysis above goes through
 unaffected. For convenience, the text implicitly supposed p' to be one-see assumption d
 above. If this assumption is relaxed, firms then would be more likely to insure, for the
 likelihood of insurance varies inversely with p and b - p. When a firm can influence the
 safety of its products, warnings seldom are exculpatory, nor is care if strict liability obtains.
 In these circumstances, the text's analysis goes through as written, for neither warnings nor
 care are substitutes for insurance; hence the risk of incurring harm actually is pL.
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 that will exceed W. Rather, the firm will face a substantial set of suits
 whose total value may exceed its wealth or it will face almost no suits at
 all. For example, the firm's product causes cancer or it does not; if the
 former, there will be many suits; if the latter, none. The first "cancer
 suit" thus informs the firm that it is in that state of the world where its
 liability exposure may exceed W. The firm may then sell its assets, distrib-
 ute the proceeds to its owners and dissolve. If the entrepreneur knows at
 the beginning that potential victims would have difficulty enforcing judg-
 ments against the owners, he also knows that he will not lose W to victims
 when accidents happen. Rather, if W is start-up costs-purchasing ma-
 chines and the like-plus the goodwill that will be lost when the firm
 disappears, and if W' is the present discounted value of the proceeds the
 firm will receive when it sells its assets, the firm will lose W - W'. This
 sum is less than W, because we implicitly assumed above that W = W.
 And the less the firm will lose to victims when liability is incurred, the
 more likely is the firm to operate without full insurance.
 3. The Possibility of Bad Behavior
 a) Limited Liability. That limited liability permits entrepreneurs to
 externalize tort risks to victims is well known.33 The literature commonly
 refers to such victims as "unrelated" because they are assumed not to
 deal with firms before their injuries and thus cannot compel firms to take
 risks into account through wage or price bargains. Potential victims who
 do bargain with firms, however, also may be unable to compel firms to
 take risks into account if they are uninformed about accident probabili-
 ties. In both cases, firms will consider risks only if accident costs are
 imposed on them through tort judgments. Limited liability reduces the
 force of this incentive because it permits entrepreneurs to put less wealth
 at risk to victims than the expected value of the accidents the firms may
 cause. It is shown here, however, that, at least as regards manufacturing
 firms, limited liability is a problem more in theory than in life. Entrepre-
 neurs have strong incentives to insure such firms fully against all acci-
 dents, and full insurance altogether prevents risk externalization. These
 incentives, though, are diluted substantially when the harms attributable
 33 A very good analysis is Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, & Stuart Turnbull, An
 Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 70 U. Toronto L. J. 117 (1980).
 The authors treat limited liability generally, and do not consider products liability problems.
 A more recent general treatment is Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited
 Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985). An early perception of the effect
 of limited liability in tort contexts is found in Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents
 (1970).
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 to a firm's actions do not materialize for several years: in such "delayed
 risk" contexts, limited liability actually can create a pathological incen-
 tive for entrepreneurs to operate firms without full insurance and thereby
 to externalize risk. Toxic substances represent the most significant case
 of delayed harm. Consequently, limited liability seems pernicious primar-
 ily in toxic substance markets.
 b) Successor Liability. When successor liability obtains, a buyer of a
 firm's assets is liable for the seller's products liability torts.34 The doctrine
 is useful because tort victims have difficulty suing the owners of dissolved
 corporations. Were a seller of corporate assets to remain in existence
 after the sale, suit would be easy; the seller would only have rearranged
 its assets, from old machines to cash or what the cash bought, and the
 victims could reach either. But if the seller dissolved, tort victims would
 have to locate and satisfy judgments against its former owners. The longer
 is the period between dissolution and the materialization of accidents, the
 more difficult is this task. Also, many states severely restrict or prohibit
 suits against former owners on claims arising after dissolution.35 The diffi-
 culties involved in suing former owners create an incentive for the owners
 to begin firms that externalize risk. The successor liability doctrine com-
 pensates for this perverse incentive.
 To perceive its function most clearly, recall that entrepreneurs are
 likely to operate without insurance if they can earn enough in the acci-
 dent-free years to recover the wealth they contributed to the firm and earn
 a profit. It is necessary, we said, to recover the value of the wealth
 originally contributed because when accidents occur this wealth is lost to
 victims. The difficulties involved in suing former owners falsify this state-
 ment. An entrepreneur who can operate until the first victims appear, sell
 the firm's assets, and vanish with the cash does not lose the wealth he
 contributed to the firm plus goodwill; rather, he loses the difference be-
 tween these things and the receipts from the asset sale. The smaller is this
 expected difference ex ante, the less wealth the entrepreneur expects to
 34 In a formal merger, the surviving entity is liable for all debts, including tort debts, of the
 predecessor corporations. When a company purchases another company's assets, the buyer
 is not ordinarily liable for the seller's debts. The successor liability doctrine deals with when
 the buyer is liable for the seller's torts. The literature and cases concerning successor
 liability are extensively summarized in Mark J. Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A
 Comment on the Problem of Successor Corporation Liability, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1559 (1984);
 Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation Liability, 58 N.Y.U.
 L. Rev. 906 (1983). See also, Frederick K. Juenger & Stephen H. Schulman, Asset Sales and
 Products Liability, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 39 (1975).
 35 See Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products
 Liability Claims, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 865 (1971).
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 lose to victims. And the less wealth lost, the more likely will the firm be to
 operate uninsured.
 Successor liability dampens the perverse incentive that the dissolution
 option creates. It does this by increasing the wealth that an entrepreneur
 will lose to victims, for its existence increases the difference between
 initial monies expended to start a firm and monies later received on the
 sale of assets. This difference widens because a successor that is liable for
 its predecessor's torts will pay less for its predecessor's assets, since they
 now come with accrued liabilities that it must bear immediately, the prior
 years of risk-free return having been enjoyed by the seller. Since buyers
 know of this risk, they will be unwilling to purchase the assets if their
 firm's net worth would be negative when the risk is considered; and if it is
 positive, they will treat the future liabilities as a lien on the present assets
 and pay accordingly, no matter whether they wish to stay in the old line of
 business or go into a new one. Imposing successor liability, moreover,
 should not disrupt the orderly operation of capital markets because the
 successor is in a good position to learn both the rate at which accidents
 happen and its predecessor's sales history, and thus be able to calculate
 the relevant exposures. As the present firm knows that it will not be able
 to escape liabilities by sale, it will therefore have an incentive to preserve
 its own marketability by taking out insurance in the first instance. It is
 better for the risk to be borne by successors who can protect themselves
 by contract than by tort victims who cannot.
 Successor liability unfortunately is less effective in practice than this
 analysis suggests. Some states do not impose it even when the successor
 uses the assets to make the same product as the original company; most
 states do not impose it if assets are sold for cash rather than stock; and no
 states impose it if the successor uses the assets to produce a different
 product from the one produced by the original company.36
 c) Bankruptcy. An entrepreneur would operate a negative-value firm
 even were limited liability abolished and successor liability complete, if
 he could function until accident costs began to accrue and then have all
 such costs-the entire delayed risk-discharged. Current law precludes
 this strategy; the weight of authority holds that tort claims based on harms
 that have yet to materialize cannot be asserted in bankruptcy.37
 d) Legal Implications. Changes in corporate law would prevent entre-
 preneurs from operating firms that fail to insure fully against knowable
 tort risks. One change is to abolish limited liability if, when a firm's
 36 See authorities cited in note 34 supra.
 37 See authorities cited in note 1 supra. A recent opinion by Judge Posner suggests that
 courts may reconsider this rule. See In re UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
 1984).
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 assets, including insurance assets, are insufficient to satisfy tort claims, (i)
 the firm knew or should have known that it faced a positive probability of
 incurring a tort liability that would exceed its wealth, and (ii) if potential
 victims bargain with it, they are uninformed. The second condition actu-
 ally is unnecessary, for the burden of the reform suggested here is to
 abolish limited liability whenever the tort system justifiably would hold
 the firm liable; and its rationale is that, as regards knowable risks, a firm's
 assets will be insufficient to meet tort claims only because its owners
 deliberately chose to operate in that way-to earn profits by externalizing
 risks. Also, the phrase "abolish limited liability" is used here as a short-
 hand for the congeries of civil remedies that the recent literature advo-
 cates to impose tort or environmental risks on firms effectively, such as
 holding the officers liable38 or holding the owners in proportion to their
 capital contribution.39 This paper's concern is not so much with how best
 to relax traditional corporate protections but with when they should be
 relaxed.
 Here is an example of what I have in mind: the Johns-Manville Com-
 pany once considered putting its asbestos-related activities into a sep-
 arately incorporated division. Such a stratagem should fail for harms
 traceable to sales made after the asbestos risk became knowable. Had
 Johns-Manville pursued it, it should have been made to satisfy all liability
 judgments for such sales that its subsidiary could not satisfy. Otherwise,
 such use of a subsidiary, or of "unrelated" divisions of a conglomerate,
 would wrongfully permit a company to externalize risk to victims.
 Successor liability also should be made complete for knowable risks.
 Successors should be liable whether they use the assets in the same line of
 business as the predecessor or in a different line.40
 If limited liability is abolished, successor liability is complete, and con-
 tingent tort claims cannot be discharged in bankruptcy,41 a firm could not
 shift delayed, knowable risks to victims. Corporate and bankruptcy law
 38 See Renier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,
 93 Yale L. J. 857, 868-76 (1984).
 39 See Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
 Conduct, 90 Yale L. J. 1, 69-79 (1980).
 40 This reform would free courts from the difficulty of deciding whether lines of business
 are sufficiently similar to hold the successor liable. For an effort to make such decisions, see
 Phillips, supra note 34.
 41 Roe recently argued that contingent tort claims should be assertable in bankruptcy to
 prevent firms from engaging in certain forms of inefficient behavior. See Roe, supra note 3.
 This proposal is not objectionable as regards knowable risks if these contingent claims are
 not dischargeable in full-if, that is, the firm is made to satisfy them to the full extent of its
 assets; Roe also advocates this. But Roe's proposal is unlikely to achieve its goals in
 practice, whether it applies to risks that are knowable or remote. See text at notes 50-54,
 infra.
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 thus would function to advance the goals that products liability law should
 serve.42
 B. Remote Risks
 To describe a risk as remote is not to say that a firm had no idea at all
 that its product could cause great harm. A risk is remote when a firm
 either (i) was this ignorant or (ii) believed great harm to be unlikely, and
 research to correct either impression was not cost justified. The standard
 products liability insurance policy covers all legal liability of a firm for
 risks within the designated class and so would protect a firm against
 remote risk impositions whose magnitudes were within the policy limits.
 When either of the two ways exists in which a remote risk manifests itself,
 however, those policy limits are likely to be too low. To see how this
 could occur, first let a firm plausibly believe that the product will not
 cause high accident costs at all. For example, the firm expects accident
 costs to range between $10,000 and $100,000. The firm then will not
 purchase more than $100,000 of insurance. If accident costs turn out to be
 $1,000,000, the firm is underinsured. Second, the firm can conceive of
 accident costs as high as $1,000,000 but plausibly believes that these large
 losses are unlikely. In this event, the firm also will be underinsured,
 though for a different reason: market insurance is overpriced. Insurance
 companies seldom have actuarial experience of new products or do their
 own research. One possible strategy for such a company would then be to
 accept our illustrative firm's estimate of the odds; in consequence, it
 would sell the firm $1,000,000 of coverage at a low rate. This strategy
 could create a serious adverse selection problem: firms with risky new
 products would portray themselves to insurance companies as selling safe
 42 The knowable delayed risk problem may be less serious than the text supposes because
 its emergence in a full equilibrium framework seems improbable. The analytical focus in
 such a framework is the market rather than the single firm. The text supposes a single firm
 that would operate for several periods, earn income, and then vanish. If the firm were not a
 monopolist, however, its rivals also would operate for several periods and vanish. The
 market for the relevant product then seemingly would have a set of firms enter, operate,
 disappear, and be replaced by a new set of firms. Alternatively, entry could take place at
 different times; then firms would continuously be entering to earn profits in the accident-free
 years and exiting when those years were up. Markets like this apparently have not been
 observed, and the latter form of behavior may not be an equilibrium since the frequent exits
 of harm-causing firms might alert workers and consumers to the product's actual riskiness.
 Thus, looking at markets rather than individual firms suggests that corporate structure may
 not be manipulated to externalize knowable delayed risks at all. This conclusion must be
 very tentatively held, however, because equilibrium results are risky to derive without doing
 the formal work. Hence the text argues that the law faces problems that are relatively easy
 to resolve even if firms would attempt to externalize knowable delayed risks.
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 new products; the companies, lacking research facilities, might be fooled.
 Insurance companies, however, are aware of adverse selection problems
 and so would pursue a different strategy: to charge relatively high rates
 until they had a contrary accident experience. A firm that believed its
 product was quite unlikely to cause serious accidents then would have a
 strong incentive not to buy market insurance; rather, it would self-insure
 for large, low probability harms-the $1,000,000 above-until it had
 enough experience to convince an insurance company that its odds esti-
 mate was correct.43 But for remote risks, its estimate is false. For ex-
 ample, the firm may believe that the $1,000,000 liability would be incurred
 with probability .0001 and set aside $100 as a loss reserve, when that
 probability actually was .01, so that $10,000 should have been set aside.
 Again, the firm is underinsured.
 Section IIB next shows that firms cannot be given incentives to insure
 fully against remote risks. Also, when uninsured products liability costs,
 alone or when added to a firm's other debts, create a total liability that
 exceeds the firm's wealth, the firm will adopt resource-wasting strategies
 to avoid paying compensation.
 1. Corporate Law
 Section IIA argued that limited liability should be abolished and succes-
 sor liability made complete for knowable risks because then firms would
 have a greater incentive to act efficiently. Efficiency meant purchasing
 full insurance. A firm that is induced to insure, however, will buy cover-
 age against the largest expected liability that it anticipates. But to say that
 a risk is remote is to say that the firm had false expectations about the
 frequency or the severity of claims. Though the incentive of such a firm to
 insure could be increased by abolishing limited liability and extending
 successor liability, the firm could not be made to insure correctly.
 In addition, to adopt these reforms when risks are remote would have
 substantial efficiency costs. Respecting the abolition of limited liability,
 entrepreneurs deciding to start firms would have an incentive to conceal
 their wealth from potential victims, for otherwise they could unexpect-
 edly lose all. The costs of concealing wealth are a deadweight loss. Also,
 potential investors in firms would have an incentive to monitor the wealth
 of other potential investors, to ensure that these shareholders were suffi-
 43 There is evidence that insurance companies are both raising rates and limiting coverage
 for toxic substances and that firms are self-insuring. See Liability Insurers are Fleeing Field
 in Wake of Big Damage Awards, Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1985, ?4, at 1, col 5; Insurers
 Are Shunning Coverage of Chemical and Other Pollution, Wall St. J., March 19, 1985, at 1,
 col. 6.
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 ciently rich so that no one shareholder would bear a disproportionate
 share of liability costs." This monitoring too is a deadweight loss. Finally,
 investment in firms that produce toxic substances will itself be reduced:45
 it would become more risky to contribute equity to such a firm, since the
 investor's personal wealth could be unpredictably destroyed. Because
 toxic substances such as drugs produce social benefits, decreased produc-
 tion of them would create welfare losses. Expanding successor liability
 for remote risks would create uncertainty in the market for used corporate
 assets, which could significantly reduce sales. Possible buyers would be
 deterred because purchase would subject their companies to literally un-
 predictable, possibly large claims.
 To be sure, if the victims of remote risks are limited to a firm's assets,
 they will often be undercompensated, for the firm is underinsured. Hence,
 should the case for imposing remote risks rest largely on the necessity of
 compensating victims, that case is seriously compromised if limited liabil-
 ity and successor liability are retained in their current form. To decide
 what should ultimately be done, then, requires an analysis of the moral
 case for compensation, which is made below. The argument above shows
 only that pursuing this case through the vehicle of corporate law reform is
 likely to generate substantial inefficiencies.
 2., Insolvency and Inefficiency
 A firm may have negative value because it is made to bear delayed,
 remote risks. If so, it is insolvent in the balance sheet sense; its liabilities,
 including tort liabilities, exceed its assets. But the firm is not necessarily
 insolvent in the equity sense because it may be able to pay its debts as
 they mature, at least for a time. When equity insolvency has not arrived, a
 firm has a choice whether to dissolve or continue. This choice permits it
 to pursue either of two inefficient strategies, to liquidate when the firm's
 going concern value exceeds its liquidation value or to do negative net
 present value projects with high early payouts. These strategies some-
 times permit firms to create gains for current claimants-the debt and
 equity-at the expense of future claimants-the victims of remote risks.
 Under current law, the future claimants can block neither strategy be-
 cause they have no say in a firm's operation. Subsection 2a illustrates
 44 A more extensive treatment of the incentive of shareholders to monitor other share-
 holders is found in Halpern, Trebilcock, & Turnbull, supra note 33.
 45 Posner argued that abolishing limited liability would dampen investment incentives
 generally. See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U.
 Chi. L. Rev. 499 (1976). The text argues that this dampening incentive will be exacerbated if
 courts impose remote risks on shareholders.
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 when a firm may liquidate inefficiently; 2b illustrates the adoption of
 negative value projects.46 Readers uninterested in the details may skip to
 2c and 2d, which summarize the data, show that current corporate and
 bankruptcy law permit both strategies, and argue that the strategies are
 difficult to prevent under any conceivable set of reforms.
 a) An Inefficient Liquidation. Consider a firm with the balance sheet
 shown in the table below. The firm may liquidate at once, after the first
 $50 of tort claims tell that it is balance sheet insolvent, or it may operate
 for one period. If it liquidates, it pays current general claimants $50,
 current tort claimants $50, its bank $327 dollars, and its shareholders $73,
 the amount left from the $500 liquidation value.
 Assets Liabilities
 Cash = 0 Bank debt = $300 at 9 percent
 Present value = $600, viewed as: Period 1 liability = $ 27
 PV = $600 + .5($300) + .5(-$300) Period 2 liability = $327
 = $600 Period 1 claims:
 a) General = $50
 Liquidation value = $500 b) Tort = $50
 Period 2 claims expected:
 a) General = $ 50
 b) Tort = $400
 The bank and shareholders could only do worse on continuance. The
 firm's $600 present value is conceptualized as a sure receipt of $600 in
 period 2 plus a .5 chance of earning or losing $300 from future operations;
 this treatment is adopted to show that future operations have risk. The
 certain value to the bank from continuance is $27, its first year interest.
 The bank's expected value from continuance is $226.50, calculated as
 46 The existence of a bankruptcy option itself is an incentive for insolvent firms to pursue
 inefficient strategies such as those the text next describes. The behavior of such firms is
 modeled in Michelle White, Public Policy toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and Other Priority
 Rules, 11 Bell J. Econ. 550 (1980); Jeremy L. Bulow & John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy
 Decision, 9 Bell J. Econ. 437 (1978). Imposing remote risks is objectionable because it
 increases the set of insolvent firms and strengthens their incentive to act inefficiently. This
 latter effect occurs because firms need not deal with future tort claimants, while the firms
 that White and Bulow and Shoven model had to deal with all claimants on their wealth. Thus
 everyone in their models who had an incentive to prevent or reduce inefficient behavior
 actually bargained with the firm. Respecting data about the relation between imposing
 remote risks on firms and insolvency, the text suggested above that the asbestos companies
 may not have foreseen the full extent of the asbestos risk. MacAvoy recently stated that the
 asbestos companies and their insurers would go bankrupt if they had to pay future claims at
 the rate the courts were making them pay current claims. See Paul MacAvoy, The Economic
 Consequences of Asbestos Related Disease 85-86 (January 1982) (Research Program in
 Government Business Relations, Yale School of Organization and Management, ser. C,
 Working Paper No. 27).
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 follows: The firm has a .5 chance of having only $300 of wealth in period 2
 ($600-$300). In this event, $300 will remain to pay claims. As the bank is
 then owed $327 there will be $777 of claims, the bank would receive 42
 percent of $300 or $126. Hence, the bank has a chance of getting $126,
 which is worth $63 ex ante. Were the firm instead to be worth $900 in
 period 2, the bank would be paid in full; a .5 chance of receiving $327 is
 valued at $163.50 ex ante. The sum of these alternatives is $226.50. The
 total value to the bank from continuance is the expected value of $226.50
 plus the sure $27, or $253.50. This is less than the $327 the bank would
 receive on liquidation, so it would refuse to make further loans and urge
 the firm to dissolve.
 The equity holders would agree. Were the firm to continue, there is a .5
 chance it would have only $300 of wealth in period 2; then its debts would
 exceed its assets and its equity would be worthless. Were the firm instead
 to have $900, its assets would exceed its liabilities by $123 ($900-$777); a
 .5 chance of receiving $123 in period 2 is worth $61.50. Hence, the ex-
 pected value to the equity from continuance is .5(0) + .5($123) = $61.50.
 Since the shareholders receive $73 on liquidation, they too will want to
 dissolve. Enough funds are available on liquidation to pay the other cur-
 rent claimants, and the future claimants have no say. Consequently, the
 firm will vanish.
 Liquidation is inefficient because the firm's going concern value ex-
 ceeds its liquidation value by $100. Also, since courts impose remote risks
 largely to compensate victims, and since future claimants will receive
 nothing, liquidation has moral costs. Here too the future claims actually
 had value. If the firm continued and was worth only $300 in period 2, the
 future claimants would be entitled to 51.5 percent; if the firm instead was
 worth $900, the future claimants would be paid in full. As there is a .5
 chance of either outcome, the expected value of continuance to them is
 $277.25. Liquidation dissipates some of this value and transfers the rest to
 current claimants. In theory, the future claimants could bribe the debt and
 equity to continue; the former would be made better off by a payment of
 at least $73.51 and the latter by a payment of at least $11.51. The future
 claimants could make both payments and still hold claims whose expected
 net value is $192.23. Subsection 2d will show, however, that coalition
 costs and free-rider problems would prevent the future claimants from
 bribing the firm to continue.
 b) Adopting Negative-Value Projects. The liquidation illustration was
 more favorable to tort claimants than real life sometimes is because it
 assumed that firms would take no steps to reduce their liquidation value
 or to increase the total claims on it. This assumption may sometimes be
 false when an entrepreneur discovers that he has inadvertently been oper-
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 ating a negative-value firm. Consider a project that will generate $200 in
 net revenue per year for two years but require a $500 payout in the third
 year. If the firm's cost of capital is 10 percent, the project's net present
 value is a minus $28.83. The entrepreneur nevertheless might cause the
 firm to do the project if major tort claims would mature in the third year;
 he would pocket $400 and then liquidate the firm. The future claimants
 would have to share the liquidation value with the $500 claimant. Alterna-
 tively, a firm may harvest natural resources earlier than it should. For
 example, let a firm own a mine that will produce $5,000 of coal if it is
 mined today; the firm expects coal prices to rise in response to rising oil
 prices but then level off. Its discount rate is 10 percent, and it believes
 that the coal will yield $7,000 if mined in a year, $8,500 if mined in two
 years, $9,500 if mined in three years, and $10,000 if mined in four years.
 The firm should mine the coal in the third year because the present dis-
 counted value of that yield is $7,142.86, which is greater than the present
 discounted value of any other yield. But if major tort claims will accrue in
 the third year, the firm will mine in the second, which does not maximize
 value.47
 Such inefficient projects sometimes are available. One example is bor-
 rowing, which brings in money at once and requires later payouts. Lend-
 ers, however, may also discover that the firm is insolvent. A more real-
 47 Respecting the text's two illustrations, for the first: net present value = 200/(1.1) +
 200/(1.1)2 - 500/(1.1)' = - $28.83. For the second:
 Time Value of Yield ($) NPV at r = .10 ($)
 0 5,000 5,000
 1 7,000 7,000/1.1 = $6,363.64
 2 8,500 8,500/(1.1)2 = $7,024.79
 3 9,500 9,500/(1.1)3 = $7,142.86
 4 10,000 10,000/(1.1)4 = $6,849.32
 This illustration is too simple because it lets the firm treat future prices as certain and does
 not let the discount rate vary with the firm's choice of technology and extraction rate. In
 reality, natural resource prices vary widely and the firm's discount rate is partly endoge-
 nous. Adding these factors does not change the basic point, which is that an insolvent firm
 has an incentive to accelerate the extraction rate inefficiently. See M. J. Brennan & E. S.
 Schwartz, Evaluating Natural Resource Investments (working paper, Univ. British Colum-
 bia 1983). The firm, in theory, might sell the right to mine coal in the third year for $7,142.86,
 thereby maximizing the value of the resource. Information asymmetries may impede such
 sales; while coal is homogeneous, the firm best knows its production function and therefore
 best knows the net yield. Also, outsiders may discount the price substantially because of
 uncertainty respecting future prices. Finally, if successor liability applied to remote risks,
 there might be no one willing to purchase the assets.
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 istic example would be for a firm to engage in a natural resource business
 that has a reclamation obligation that the firm plans not to meet. For
 instance, a firm might strip mine coal for a time, planning not to recon-
 struct the land. More simply, a firm, when calculating a project's value,
 should include the cost of replacing necessary machines. A negative-
 value project can thus become positive if no replacement cost is assumed.
 Firms that plan to dissolve will not assume replacements. Thus they may
 exhaust present or new assets, vanishing when these are gone.
 c) Data. Current claimants on a firm that learns ex post that it has
 negative value have incentives either to liquidate the firm though its going
 concern value exceeds its liquidation value or to have it pursue inefficient
 projects with high early payouts. Until recently, few firms have been in
 this situation, and these seem not to have been systematically studied.
 The anecdotal evidence, though, is consistent with the story. A group of
 current claimants against Johns-Manville have asked the bankruptcy
 court to liquidate the company, though management claims that its going
 concern value exceeds its liquidation value; rather, management's hope
 seemingly is to have the bankruptcy court eliminate or substantially re-
 duce the future claims.48 The court's apparent lack of sympathy with this
 hope appears to underlie the frequent claims that the company is stall-
 ing-refusing to propose a reorganization plan while continuing to use the
 protection of the bankruptcy court. With respect to possible motives for a
 stall, Johns-Manville has been accused of paying unusually high divi-
 dends, which redistribute wealth in favor of current claims and against
 future ones. Also, it allegedly is overcutting timber, perhaps because it
 has no intention to replant, in which case it may be pursuing a negative
 value project with a high current payout, because it is harvesting too
 early, which also is inefficient.49 The plausibility of the story told above
 together with evidence of this sort suggest at least the provisional accu-
 racy of a prediction that ex post negative-value firms will be run
 inefficiently.
 48 See Manville Corp. Faces Increasing Opposition to Bankruptcy Filing, Wall St. J.
 January 31, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
 49 Johns-Manville's behavior is described in Roe, supra note 3. The deadweight losses
 that occur in insolvency contexts when some claimants on a firm redistribute wealth in their
 favor from other claimants may be mitigated when claims can be freely purchased and
 recombined, for then it would reward an economic agent to purchase all of the claims on a
 firm and make economically efficient decisions on its behalf. There is weak evidence that
 this sometimes happens. See Carliss Y. Baldwin & Scott P. Mason, The Resolution of
 Claims in Financial Distress: The Case of Massey Ferguson, 38 J. Finance 505 (1983). The
 lack of a market for future tort claims and the obvious difficulties in creating one imply that
 the deadweight losses the text describes will not be mitigated by such recontracting.
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 d) Legal Remedies. Current law cannot prevent inefficient liquida-
 tions when firms can pay off existing claimants. Today, a firm can liq-
 uidate privately or in bankruptcy. The latter route is open because future
 claimants now lack standing in bankruptcy proceedings and so could not
 intervene to ask bankruptcy judges to require reorganization-continu-
 ance-rather than to permit liquidation. The future claimants could be
 given standing in bankruptcy but, as Roe recognized, no way now exists
 to get equity-solvent firms into bankruptcy if they do not want to go
 there.5? If such firms could do better by liquidating privately than by being
 forced to continue, they would pay off current debt and vanish.
 Future claimants could be authorized to trigger bankruptcy proceedings
 rather than wait for them. Too few claimants would take up the chance,
 however, to make this reform helpful. The set of future claimants is
 composed of persons who have been exposed to toxic substances. These
 persons would often regard the certain costs of a lawsuit to force a bank-
 ruptcy as higher than the uncertain gains. These gains are uncertain for
 three reasons. First, persons exposed to toxic substances suffer harm
 with a probability that is less than one and difficult to calculate precisely.
 Also, the harm will occur an undetermined time in the future. The gain to
 a future claimant from bringing a suit cannot exceed the expected value of
 his injury; when the probability and timing of injury are both uncertain so
 also is this expected value. Second, the expected value of the injury is
 higher than the expected gain that would be realized in bankruptcy. The
 value of a bankruptcy claim is partly a function of how many such claims
 there are. When a firm has $1 million in assets and $2 million in claims,
 each claim is worth 17 percent more than if the asset value were un-
 changed but there were $3 million in claims. A future claimant would
 seldom know how many other such claims there were; hence, he would
 have difficulty valuing his claim in a bankruptcy, even if he could calcu-
 late its expected value independent of bankruptcy.5" Finally, a future
 claimant who is a consumer or worker could not easily know whether the
 firm could pay his claim, which might be small or arise early, though the
 5o See Roe, supra note 3.
 51 Valuing claims on firms is always complicated by the possibility of bankruptcy; should
 bankruptcy occur, the value of a claim reduces to its value in bankruptcy, but this is hard to
 calculate ex ante because it is hard to predict what a firm's asset-to-debt ratio will be when it
 becomes insolvent. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A
 Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1, 24 (1981). This uncertainty shrinks substan-
 tially for current claims when bankruptcy actually occurs; then debts and assets are at least
 roughly knowable. But uncertainty as to claim value may never shrink much for current and
 future claimants if future claims are provable in bankruptcy, because it is very difficult to
 ascertain the number and value of claims that have not arisen.
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 firm could not pay all. To force a bankruptcy, a future claimant would
 have to incur certain expenses. That is, he would have to pay lawyers to
 bring a lawsuit that the firm would strongly contest. The very uncertain
 value of the gains from such a suit often may seem lower than these
 expenses.52
 In addition, to force a bankruptcy is to provide a public good. Once a
 bankruptcy has been triggered, no future claimant could be excluded from
 it, whether he contributed to the triggering law suit or not. When the costs
 of a bankruptcy suit exceed the expected gain to any individual claimant
 from bankruptcy, no bankruptcy would occur, even if future claimants
 could value their claims accurately. Rather, a suit would be brought only
 if a claimant coalition could be formed. The large number of future claim-
 ants, the difficulty of identifying them and of communication among them,
 and the incentive of each to let others finance the law suit make formation
 of an effective coalition unlikely.53 And without such a coalition, future
 claimants also would not bribe firms to continue, though their going con-
 cern value exceeded their liquidation value.
 For all of these reasons, few future claimants would attempt to force
 bankruptcies or otherwise prevent firms from dissolving. And those that
 made determined efforts could be bought off. Hence, allowing future
 claimants to trigger bankruptcies would seldom prevent inefficient liqui-
 dations.
 Allowing a public agency to force bankruptcies may have a better
 chance of success, but not much better because the agency often would
 not know when to act. Future claimants would have to come forward to
 notify the agency; doing this raises many of the problems just discussed,
 for the future claimant actually is a person, who may be reluctant to
 become involved in an administrative proceeding when he is now healthy
 and may never suffer. The experience of the Federal Trade Commission
 and the Justice Department in attempting to prevent rather than undo
 52 The contingent fee allows persons to transfer some of the litigation risk to lawyers for a
 fee, but the litigation risk for future claims seems so high that lawyers would be unlikely to
 invest substantial resources in such suits.
 53 Class actions can function to mitigate the public-good aspects of litigation, but the
 diversities among current asbestos claimants, for example, have so far prevented classes
 being certified for them. The difficulty remains, a fortiori, for future claims. The plaintiffs'
 tort bar conceivably could have sufficiently low coalition costs and sufficiently homoge-
 neous interests to mitigate some of the difficulties the text discusses. This seems a remote
 possibility, however. The issue here is not whether the state should permit future claimants
 to trigger bankruptcies, an issue on which the tort bar perhaps could lobby, but whether the
 future claimants of a particular firm will trigger its bankruptcy. This requires a coalition to
 form around a single lawsuit, not a general issue; for the reasons given above, such coali-
 tions will be unlikely to form.
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 noncompetitive mergers also suggests that a public agency cannot be
 effective unless firms are required to report extensively to the government
 about proposed and present business activities. The market anticipates
 many of these activities, yet the firms that they would adversely affect
 seemingly lack a sufficient voluntary incentive to notify the relevant gov-
 ernment agencies. Also, the sanctions for failing to report are imposed on
 the offending firms. When firms are vanishing rather than continuing,
 sanctions for failing to report to a Federal agency their plans to vanish
 would be difficult to apply. Thus, a federal agency too would seldom
 prevent inefficient liquidations.54
 e) Concluding Remarks. Imposing remote risks on firms generates
 particular efficiency costs, but these costs are not entirely absent when
 courts impose only knowable risks. A firm may fail to do the optimal
 amount of research; if so, it may warn inadequately and underinsure.
 When the knowable risk materializes, this firm too will face large unin-
 sured liabilities that create incentives to liquidate inappropriately or waste
 wealth. However, the sanctions that now follow from knowable risk im-
 positions, together with those that would follow from adoption of the
 reforms Section IIA suggests, would ensure that there would be few such
 firms. In contrast, the particular efficiency costs that Section IIB describe
 are the inevitable accompaniment of remote risk impositions, for firms
 seldom could insure fully against remote risks and so would have incen-
 tives to act inappropriately whenever these risks materialize.
 Courts conceivably could err by characterizing a risk as knowable that
 actually is remote; if so the difficulties just noted may apply widely,
 especially if the reforms urged in Section IIA are adopted. The possibility
 of error does not imply different conclusions from those reached above.
 As Section IC showed, the response of firms to adjudicatory uncertainty
 is to do more research than may be optimal. The effect of this research
 will often be to produce court or jury findings favorable to defendants or
 lead to the discovery of more risks; either outcome reduces the likelihood
 that judicial error will disadvantage firms in the ways that Section IIB
 54 Roe, supra note 3, argues that both future claimants and a public agency should be
 authorized to trigger bankruptcies but, in my view, does not give adequate weight to the
 difficulties raised here. Roe, however, recognizes other difficulties with his proposals. He
 argues for them not because he believes that they are perfect but because his paper assumes
 that future claims must be satisfied; given this assumption, he must find some way to satisfy
 them. The difficulties with his proposals, and the extraordinary complexity of the compensa-
 tion schemes he and others are driven to propose, suggest rather that the question whether
 to pay future claims should be regarded as open. This paper begins with that view, and
 Section III argues that when the future claims arise from remote risks, they should not be
 imposed on firms at all. If this view is accepted, whether and how these future claims can be
 asserted in bankruptcy are no longer questions.
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 describes. Also, these disadvantages could be avoided completely only if
 courts imposed no risks on firms, which plainly would be unwise. This
 paper's compromise-to impose only knowable risks but to make those
 risk impositions effective-is itself risky but pursues all of the relevant
 policy goals more effectively than any competing rule.
 III. THE CASE FOR NOT IMPOSING REMOTE RISKS
 The case against judicial imposition of remote risks on firms follows
 from the premise that misfortunes that "life" visits on people should not
 be shifted directly to other people (or to firms) unless "good reasons"
 exist to shift them. Life obviously is partly constituted by human actions.
 And the good reasons can be consequential (shifting losses is efficient) or
 deontological (a particular set of unfortunates has a right to have others
 bear losses that first fall on them). The collectivity of course may have
 duties of justice or benevolence to unfortunates, but private citizens, it is
 assumed, cannot be made to bear the full burden, unless good reasons
 exist. One justification for this premise is that shifting losses is costly.
 Costs should not be incurred without good cause. A second justification
 follows from our society's respect for and protection of individual auton-
 omy. Such a commitment to individualism implies that a person's misfor-
 tune is his or her own affair, unless good reasons exist to make it an-
 other's affair.
 Section III supposes these justifications to persuade and argues that
 acceptance of the basic premise implies the correctness of a rule holding
 firms liable only for knowable risks. The argument to here partly estab-
 lishes this claim. Section I showed that, as regards such unavoidably
 dangerous products as toxic substances, remote risk impositions would
 actually cause firms to discover fewer dangers than would knowable risk
 impositions. Section II then showed that remote risk impositions generate
 substantial costs because firms have incentives to engage in resource-
 wasting strategies when large, unanticipated liabilities materialize. There-
 fore, not only do efficiency reasons fail to support shifting the costs of
 remote risks from victims to firms, but these reasons affirmatively imply
 that firms are the wrong risk bearers." Section III next argues that justice
 reasons also cannot support imposing remote risks on firms.
 5 In addition to these efficiency concerns, remote risk impositions sometimes may point-
 lessly drive firms out of business. This could occur when a remote risk materializes such that
 victims' costs exceeded the value of firms in a market, but the product is viable with
 warnings. Viability is possible if peculiarly sensitive persons could avoid exposure and
 others could take appropriate precautions. For example, persons who smoke are approxi-
 mately sixty times more likely than nonsmokers to become ill from asbestos exposure.
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 A tort plaintiff may rest a claim for relief on any of three aspects of
 justice: retributive justice, which would support imposing liability to pun-
 ish the defendant's morally culpable behavior; distributive justice, which
 would support imposing liability to produce a fairer distribution of wealth;
 and corrective or compensatory justice, which would support imposing
 liability to rectify a loss that the defendant wrongfully caused. A justice-
 as-retribution case seems groundless because a plaintiff would be suing in
 strict liability, which does not require a finding of fault, let alone immoral
 fault, to sustain an imposition of liability.56 The victim of a remote risk
 also lacks tenable distributional and compensatory justice claims.
 A. Distributional Justice
 1. Loss Spreading
 The loss-spreading justification for strict liability cannot support remote
 risk impositions because firms will not spread the losses associated with
 remote risks. Firms spread losses by insuring against them and reflecting
 premium costs in their prices. Because firms are ignorant of remote risks,
 they do not insure them fully. Consequently, when these risks materialize
 a court's choices are limited to letting the resultant costs lie or ordering
 direct wealth transfers from a firm's shareholders to plaintiffs. Neither
 outcome produces loss spreading.
 Courts sometimes suggest that firms will reflect the cost of judgments
 for remote risks in future prices." Were this true, at least part of the
 normative case for loss spreading would have to change, for those who
 benefited from the product that caused harm, the past users, would pay
 nothing, while those who did not benefit, the future users, would be
 largely responsible. But in fact the cost of past judgments will not be
 reflected in future prices at all. A cost change will not affect price unless it
 causes a firm's marginal cost curve to shift. When a firm discovers that it
 must make a set of liability payments to remote risk victims, it incurs an
 immediate cost, the present discounted value of the payment stream. This
 Hence, nonsmoking asbestos workers, particularly if they use respirators, may be bearing
 acceptable risks. If so, asbestos could be viable with warnings. Then such products should
 continue to be produced with warnings, but the firms originally in the market may dissolve
 as a result of insolvency. Other firms will then enter, but these entry costs are a waste, for
 the original firms could have continued to produce had they been made only to warn after the
 risk became knowable.
 56 See Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pt. 1), 1 Law &
 Phil. 371, 374-75 (1982). Section IIIB will argue that a firm's failure to discover a remote risk
 is in any event not morally culpable.
 57 For example, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 439 (1982).
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 cost is unrelated to production and so will never shift the firm's marginal
 cost curve.'" Hence, to impose on firms risks that they cannot profitably
 discover is, as was just said, to compel direct wealth transfers from share-
 holders to victims.59
 2. Distributional Justice in General
 Courts deciding products liability cases explicitly refuse to justify out-
 comes on distributional grounds.60 Though this denial is sometimes insin-
 cere, it is always correct. To make out a distributional justice case, a
 claimant must show that an existing distribution of wealth should be
 altered in his favor. A refusal to impose remote risks on firms benefits
 shareholders at the expense of victims. Hence, a victim must claim that it
 is unjust to burden victims as a class rather than shareholders as a class or
 that it is unjust to burden him rather than the particular shareholders of
 the firm he sues. The former claim is weak because the classes victim and
 shareholder are too much alike. Many shareholders are not rich and many
 victims are not poor. Also, many shareholders are potential victims; a
 58 Henderson argued that firms will spread the losses from difficult-to-anticipate risks
 over products unrelated to those that caused injury, thereby misallocating resources. See
 James Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Calif. L. Rev.
 919, 942-44 (1981). However, the liability for such losses will not be reflected in prices at all,
 as it does not affect variable or fixed costs. Gary Schwartz agrees that damages for unfore-
 seen risks will not be spread, but seems to believe that this is so because firms in a competi-
 tive industry operate where price equals cost and so have no power to raise price. See
 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 825 n.180. Such firms, though, would raise prices if marginal
 costs rose; for remote risk impositions they will not.
 59 Page recently argued that firms should bear remote risks because the law should protect
 "justifiable consumer expectations," and consumers can justifiably expect always to buy
 safe products. Joseph A. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case against Comment K and
 For Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 853, 889 (1983). Page begins with the standard
 manufacturing defect case, in which the firm knows the risk. If the firm markets a defective
 product without a warning, it makes "an implied representation of safety"; the effect of this
 representation is to "deprive the consumer of the opportunity to evaluate the risk and to
 decide whether to accept it." Id. at 889 (footnote omitted). The argument has two aspects:
 (a) the consumers' expectations derive from the "implied representation"; (b) these expec-
 tations are "justifiable" because the normative goal is to induce manufacturers to make safe
 products or supply consumers with information so the consumers can protect themselves.
 Page then argues that this analysis justifies manufacturer liability when a product poses "an
 unknown or unknowable generic hazard"; there too, "an implied representation of safety"
 is made. Id. The second aspect of Page's argument falls for such products, however. Impos-
 ing liability for remote risks neither increases safety nor warnings. Hence, even if consumers
 in fact always do expect products to be safe, they could not "justifiably" expect firms to
 assume remote risks. As Page himself recognizes, to make out a traditional expectations
 argument, one must first show "which consumer expectations are justifiable"; only then can
 one ask what actually was expected. Id. at 887.
 6 This is what courts mean by the frequent statements that manufacturers are not insur-
 ers and that tort liability is sometimes strict but never absolute.
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Mon, 18 Sep 2017 23:44:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND REMOTE RISK 731
 substantial portion of firm wealth is held by employee pension funds and
 insurance companies. Further, many victims have at least partial insur-
 ance while shareholders, ex hypothesi, have none because the risks were
 remote. Finally, redistributing wealth to victims cannot be justified by the
 notion that, other things equal, money should be transferred from large
 groups to small ones, if the small ones need help. Often, as in the Johns-
 Manville case, the number of potential victims may approximate the num-
 ber of shareholders. Therefore, a plaintiff's claim for relief based on his
 membership in the victim class does not implicate the justice of society's
 basic institutions in the way claims that wealth should be transferred from
 the more to the less well off do.
 A victim must instead argue that it is unjust for him rather than the
 particular shareholders of the defendant firm to bear the costs of a remote
 risk. Distributional justice theories, however, do not support such fine-
 grained distinctions among persons. Rawls's theory, for example, claims
 only that society's "basic structure" should be just, that society should
 ensure an equal distribution of "primary" goods, and that any other
 distinctions in the basic structure should be to the advantage of the worst-
 off group.61 The basic structure is composed of such principal institutions
 as "parliaments, markets and systems of property"; these derive from "a
 public system of rules.'"62 If the basic structure is just, then individual
 distinctions are likely to be made correctly. Rawls thus explicitly states
 that it is a "mistake" for a theory of justice to consider the "relative
 positions of individuals. . . . If it is asked in the abstract whether one
 distribution of a given stock of things to definite individuals with known
 desires and preferences is better than another, then there is simply no
 answer to this question."63 Hence, a victim cannot justify a transfer from
 a particular set of shareholders to himself on Rawlsian grounds.
 Utilitarian distributional theories also cannot justify such a claim. This
 is not because interpersonal utility comparisons between shareholders
 and victims cannot be made rigorously; such comparisons may be made in
 an acceptably rough and ready way, if one has enough information about
 the parties' particular circumstances. But getting this information in the
 context of lawsuits as these now are run is difficult to do. And the effort
 would also permit courts and other strangers to investigate the personal
 lives of litigants more thoroughly than current conceptions of privacy
 permit. If one takes the sensible, and popular, view that a pursuit of
 61 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
 62 Id. at 55.
 63 Id. at 87-88. See also 304.
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 utilitarianism should be tempered by rights constraints, these privacy
 concerns imply that utilitarian distributional justice claims also are out of
 place when a particular individual claims money from another. Rather,
 utilitarianism seems better suited to evaluating society's basic redistribu-
 tional decisions. To do this requires interpersonal utility comparisons
 between large, disparate groups, such as rich and poor, that can be drawn
 on the basis of what people in general are like, and without the particular
 personal information on which individualized interpersonal utility com-
 parisons must rest.64
 These distributional arguments may be objected to on the ground that
 shareholders do or could diversify away from the risk of a particular
 firm's bankruptcy and thus would not suffer when victims take the firm's
 assets. This objection is without merit. If the shareholder's loss exceeds
 de minimus, the premise that began Section III applies: victims' costs
 should not be shifted to others unless good reasons appear. The share-
 holders' loss from remote risk impositions would exceed de minimus
 because it is difficult fully to diversify away from the relevant risk and
 because the risk will not be fully impounded in the price of a firm's stock.
 Respecting the former point, a rule imposing remote risks, were it widely
 adopted, would affect a large number of firms, benefiting workers and
 consumers at the expense of shareholders and managers. Since share-
 holders cannot hold stock in workers and consumers, they could not
 diversify fully away from remote risk impositions. Even if they bore only
 the "market risk," the legal rule would increase the level of this risk.
 Respecting investment returns, the strong form of the efficient market
 hypothesis holds that market prices reflect "all the information that can
 be acquired by painstaking fundamental analysis of the company and
 economy."65 An outsider's fundamental analysis of the company would
 not reveal the existence of remote risks that are unknown to the firm's
 managers unless the outsider was willing to do what the managers are
 not-to lose money at research. Because such outsiders are unlikely to
 exist, no one in a market will be able to value remote risks. Consequently,
 the price of shares in a firm such as Johns-Manville was overstated ex
 ante, in that it failed to reflect the risk actually associated with the firm's
 income stream. A person holding a portfolio that included Johns-Manville
 stock thus paid too much for that portfolio and will lose the difference
 between what he should have and did pay, compounded to reflect alterna-
 64 This argument derives from Brian Barry, Fair Division and Social Justice (unpublished
 manuscript, Cal. Inst. Tech. 1984).
 65 Richard Brealy & Stuart Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 270 (2d ed. 1984).
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 tive investment opportunities. Given the radical dilution to which Johns-
 Manville stock will be subject, this loss is not trivial.66 Therefore, share-
 holders can be expected to bear noticeable losses were remote risks to be
 imposed on firms; no distributional justice reasons support making share-
 holders worse off in this way.
 B. Compensatory Justice
 The compensatory justice approach to tort law is concerned to compen-
 sate only persons whose harms are causally linked to the wrongful con-
 duct of others. Those injured in this way have a right to redress; the
 injurers have a duty to pay it.67 A plaintiff must then prove, to establish a
 compensatory justice case for relief, that defendant caused his injury and
 did so wrongfully. Plaintiffs can establish a compensatory justice case for
 relief when risks are knowable, and can establish the necessary condition
 of causation when risks are remote.68 Firms, however, do not act wrong-
 fully toward victims in connection with remote risks because they are not
 morally responsible for failing to warn that these risks exist. Since the
 existence of wrongful conduct is a necessary condition for the establish-
 ment of a compensatory justice case, no remote risk plaintiff can make
 this case out.
 66 In the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, the firm's managers agreed to accept a 67 percent
 dilution in the value of the firm's stock but plaintiffs' lawyers are holding out for 80 percent.
 The stock fell from a 1981 high of 26 to a mid-1983 price of 9. See Barrons, July 23, 1984, at
 6-7. The Manville shareholders strongly opposed the most recent plan, claiming that it
 would reduce by as much as 80 percent the value of their present holdings. See Holders
 Oppose Manville Reorganization Plan, Los Angeles Times, August 6, 1985, ? IV, at 1, col. 1.
 67 Epstein seems first to have argued that tort law's function is to redress injuries that
 others cause. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151
 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3
 J. Legal Stud. 165 (1974); Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. Legal Stud. 391
 (1975). The full argument is in Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability: Toward a
 Reformulation of Tort Law (1980). The standard critique is John Borgo, Causal Paridigms in
 Tort Law, 8 J. Legal Stud. 419 (1979), which agrees with Epstein that tort law must require
 the existence of a causal link between injurer and victim but argues that Epstein's causal
 notions are too primitive and his moral theory is insufficiently developed. The fullest current
 statement of the compensatory justice aspect of tort law is in a series of papers by Coleman.
 See Coleman, supra note 56; Jules Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and
 Limits (pt. 2), 2 Law & Phil. 5 (1983); Jules Coleman, Mental Abnormality, Personal Re-
 sponsibility and Tort Liability, in Mental Illness: Law and Public Policy 107 (B. A. Brody &
 H. Engelhardt, Jr., eds. 1980).
 68 An extensive analysis showing the causal link between a firm's conduct and a victim's
 injury, for both knowable and remote risk cases, is found in the working paper version of
 this article. Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy (Cal.
 Inst. Tech. Social Science Working Paper No. 542, 1984) at 67-76. The working paper also
 shows that firms are responsible for the harms they cause when risks are knowable. Id.
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 It is unnecessary to develop a full theory of responsibility for the harms
 one causes to show that firms are not responsible for failing to warn. This
 is because any full theory would make the element of the manufacturer's
 choice an important feature; and this element has considerable explana-
 tory power. Choice is relevant on the following argument: (a) to say that a
 person is responsible for the harms he causes is at least to say that he had
 a choice whether to cause the harms or not; (b) one has a choice only if
 one acts under conditions that insure intentionality; (c) the most impor-
 tant such condition for the present purpose is that the chooser was in-
 formed of the likely consequences of his acts; little or no moral weight
 attaches to choices made in ignorance;69 (d) this condition is put too
 simply because one may choose to remain ignorant, yet persons cannot
 escape responsibility if they deliberately move forward while looking
 down; (e) thus a person's choice should be regarded as uninformed, from
 a moral point of view, if and only if the person is ignorant in fact of the
 likely consequences of his actions and his ignorance is justifiable.
 Both requirements of condition e are met in remote risk cases. A risk is
 remote when the possible harm that a product could cause is too little and
 too unlikely to justify a research project to learn any more about what the
 harm actually is. Not to do additional research in this circumstance max-
 imizes welfare. Also eschewing research is not disrespectful to potential
 victims in any neo-Kantian sense. Were research done, the victims would
 have to pay, yet they would not want to pay because, ex hypothesi, the
 research is not worth doing. To omit research that no one wants is to
 further rather than retard people's concerns. Hence, firms neither know
 nor should know about the existence of remote risks.
 This analysis does not conflate an economic argument that firms are not
 responsible-research is not profit maximizing-with a moral argument.
 Economic and moral arguments are not necessarily coextensive, but it is
 difficult to see a noneconomic argument that would hold firms responsible
 for failing to discover and warn against remote risks. That this difficulty
 exists is unsurprising, as may be illustrated by considering a firm's actual
 choices. It can choose not to make a product though the product is useful,
 69 Alan Donagan states: "It is impermissible to blame anybody for an action except as
 falling under a description under which it is voluntary, that is, done knowingly. . . . That it
 [the action] falls under other descriptions is his good or bad fortune . . . an agent is not
 answerable for his good or bad fortune." Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality 121, 126
 (1977). Donagan derives this view from Judeo-Christian morality, and it is also Kant's
 position. Recently, some philosophers have attempted to work out a concept of "moral
 luck," in which an agent can assess the morality of his own actions in a nonutilitarian way by
 asking how those actions actually turned out. See B. Williams, Moral Luck 20-39 (1981); T.
 Nagel, Mortal Questions 24-38 (1979). These efforts seem to me to be incoherent and
 mistaken, and in any event their authors apparently do not regard them as especially helpful
 to people who want to assess actors other than themselves. See Williams, supra, at 36-37.
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 seems safe, and therefore has customers. It can warn that the product is
 dangerous though no persuasive grounds to believe this exist and the
 warning will reduce sales by frightening consumers without apparent
 cause. Or the firm can conduct a research program whose costs exceed its
 expected gains, and with no guidance as to how much money it is morally
 necessary for the firm to lose. In a world where firms are supposed to earn
 profits these are not real choices. Consequently, an independent moral
 ground for holding firms responsible here is unlikely to be found; a valid
 moral ground for imposing a duty seemingly must presuppose the exis-
 tence of actors for whom compliance would not entail a contradiction.
 And so no compensatory justice case for imposing remote risks on firms
 exists.
 C. The Humanitarian Claim
 A humanitarian claim to relieve needless suffering always exists. Vic-
 tims of remote risks needlessly suffer; they too could not have discovered
 the danger and it harmed them. Humanitarian claims, however, are sel-
 dom vindicated in lawsuits. There are too many of them and they make us
 all defendants. In a world of scarce resources, the questions they raise are
 how to rank the claimants, how much each of them should receive, and
 how much of the obligation to give must each of us satisfy. None of these
 questions is justiciable. Are asbestos victims more deserving of relief than
 sickle cell anemia victims or tornado victims? Should asbestos victims be
 given medical care only? Compensation for pain and suffering? Compen-
 sation for their dependents? If no one in particular is morally responsible
 for their plight but they have moral claims against us all, should courts
 allow victims to sue oil companies? Real estate tycoons? Union pension
 funds? If it would be supererogatory for each of these possible defendants
 to contribute their entire wealth to the relief of victims, how much should
 they be made to pay? No moral theories directly imply principled and
 relatively precise answers to these questions. Yet it is just such answers
 that this society wants courts to give. Hence, the humanitarian case for
 relieving the suffering of victims of remote risks cannot support imposing
 those risks on firms through the vehicle of products liability suits.
 To acknowledge the existence of a humanitarian case, however, is to
 reintroduce efficiency concerns, for some forms of public funding con-
 ceivably could create resource misallocations that exceed those that
 would flow from judicial imposition of remote risks. Given the difficulty of
 quantifying either form of misallocation, general efficiency conclusions
 seem hard to draw. One may assume that society is otherwise well or-
 dered, so that public funding is done in such a way as to have no efficiency
 costs; but this assumption is very strong. A more sensible way to proceed
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 is to recognize that the difficulty just noted is unlikely to be important in
 practice, for the probable response of Congress in tort risk contexts
 would be to adopt a workman's compensation solution, in which firms
 have clearly defined obligations to contribute to a fund (or purchase insur-
 ance), workers' damages are explicitly limited and specified and the fed-
 eral remedy is made exclusive.70 Such solutions in effect internalize risk
 costs and make them predictable and so should not cause serious misallo-
 cations.
 IV. CONCLUSION
 Courts should not impose remote risks on firms. A remote risk is a risk
 whose full extent a cost-justified research program would not reveal. To
 impose such risks is unfair, for it makes firms responsible for what they
 would not prevent. Also, firms have incentives to pursue inefficient strat-
 egies, such as liquidating when their going concern value exceeds their
 liquidation value, just to avoid the surprising liability that a remote risk
 imposition creates. The use of these strategies apparently underlies the
 extraordinary problems that bankruptcy and corporate law face in situa-
 tions such as the asbestos disaster. These bodies of law can conveniently
 resolve the problems that products liability accidents create, when firms
 can anticipate the risk of those accidents. But corporate and bankruptcy
 law can never cope with the chaos that can result when firms are made to
 bear large liabilities for which they could not plan.
 The fairness and efficiency objections to imposing remote risks on firms
 imply the error of such impositions unless strong instrumental or justice
 reasons exist to hold firms liable. But there are no such reasons. Imposing
 remote risks advances none of the instrumental goals that tort law pur-
 sues, nor is it implied by any justice-based tort theory. This is not to say
 that society owes no obligation to the victims of remote risks. Our coun-
 try routinely honors the humanitarian claims of persons harmed by unex-
 pected disasters. The private law suit, however, has traditionally been
 regarded as an impermissible method of meeting such obligations. That
 the victims of some remote risks can conveniently cast their claims in the
 form of private law suits is a contingent fact, not a justification for altering
 this practice.
 70 Most of the bills now before Congress to compensate asbestos victims are of this type.
 See, for example, H.R. 5735, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 5224, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
 (1981). One bill makes the victim's remedy nonexclusive and has no cap on damages, but it
 also exculpates firms if "the release [of the substance] was not the result of a failure of the
 defendant to exercise due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned in light of
 all relevant facts and circumstances." H.R. 7300, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), 101(c)(2).
 This section invites, if it does not require, courts to impose only knowable risks on firms.
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